The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Catholic Law Scholarship Repository
Scholarly Articles

Faculty Scholarship

2012

The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure: In Search of
Conservation Value
Roger Colinvaux
The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/scholar
Part of the Property Law and Real Estate Commons, and the Taxation-Federal Commons

Recommended Citation
Roger Colinvaux, The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure: In Search of Conservation Value, 37
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2012).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Faculty Scholarship at Catholic Law Scholarship
Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Scholarly Articles by an authorized administrator of Catholic Law
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact edinger@law.edu.

The Conservation Easement Tax
Expenditure: In Search of Conservation
Value
Roger Colinvaux*
Introduction
.....................................
......... 2
I. Assessing the Value of the Conservation Easement Tax
Expenditure
.............................................
8
A. Costs to the Government, Other Costs ......................
9
B. Conservation Benefits
....................................
18
1. Standard Measures: Number of Acres and Land Trusts ........... 18
2. Easement Value Does Not Equal Conservation Value ............... 19
3. Conservation Purpose Is Not a Useful Measure of Conservation
Benefit............................................23
4. Quantifying Conservation Benefit?....................26
5. Conclusion..........................................28
II. Toward a Tax Benefit Grounded in Conservation Value ................. 29
A. A Brief History of the Enactment of the Easement Deduction ........ 29
B. The Problem of Value: A New Measure for the Tax Benefit Is
Needed
............................
.................. 31
1. Lost Economic Development Value Is Not the Right Measure for
the Tax Benefit
................................
...... 31
2. Consequences of Using Lost Economic Development Value as the
Measure............................................34
3. Conservation Value Should Be the Measure of the Tax
Benefit.............................................37
4. Possible Alternative Measures: A Percentage of the Value of the
Entire Interest or Cost-Basis
..................
........... 38
C. The Amount of the Benefit and a Conservation Tax Credit ......
41
III. Reforming the Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure .............. 47
A. Replace the Tax Expenditure with a Direct Spending Program?.....47
B. Elements of a Tax Credit.................
............... 49
* Associate Professor of Law, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of
Law; Legislation Counsel, Joint Committee on Taxation, U.S. Congress, 2001-2008.
Copyright Roger Colinvaux. Thanks to Gordon Clay, Karin Gross, Thomas Holtmann,
Gerald Korngold, Ronald Schultz, Joan Youngman, Dean Zerbe, and the participants at the
Lincoln Institute of Land Policy seminar for their thoughts and comments. Thanks also to
Lindsey Cloud for research assistance.

1

2

COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAw

[Vol. 37:1

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Conservation Purposes
................................ 49
49
................................................
Exclusions
Eligibility for, and Levels of, the Default Percentage(s) ............ 50
Enforcement, Perpetuity, and Eligible Donee Organizations.......52
Higher Credit Percentages Based on Satisfaction of Additional
Conservation Criteria...................................56
6. Refundability and Carryovers ...........................
59
7. Summary
..........................................
59
IV. Conclusion.
.................................
.......... 60

INTRODUCTION
Since the mid-twentieth century, property owners in the United
States have been encouraged to dedicate land for conservation.' In
many respects, the need to conserve is great,2 and, by some
measures, the push for land conservation has been successful. In
the past several decades, there have been dramatic increases both
in the number of acres dedicated to a conservation purpose3 and in
the number of private land trusts.4 This is due in part to a federal
1. The land conservation movement took hold in the mid-twentieth century. For recent
overviews of the development of the conservation movement, see RICHARI) BREWER,
CONSERVANCY: THE LAND TRUST MOVEMENT IN AMERICA 32 (2003); Zachary Bray, Reconciling
Development and Natural Beauty: The Promise and Dilenma of Conservation Easements, 34 HARV.

ENvTL. L. REV. 119, 124-30 (2010). The world's largest conservancy organization, The
Nature Conservancy, was founded by a small group of scientists in 1946 as the Ecologist's
Union.

Our Histoy, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY,

http://www.nature.org/aboutus/vision

mission/history/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). Today, it operates in all fifty states
and in over thirty countries.

About Us, THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.

org/aboutus/index.htm (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). The Internal Revenue Service (IRS)
first recognized a tax benefit for conservation easement charitable contributions in 1964.
Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
2. Population growth, urban sprawl, and climate change all present land use challenges
in which land conservation can play an instrumental role. SeeJessica Owley, ChangingProperty
in a Changing World: A Call for the End of Perpetual ConservationEasements, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
121, 124-26 (2011); Nancy A. McLaughlin, Increasing the Tax Incentives for Conservation
Easement Donations-A Responsible Approach, 31 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 3 (2004).

3. See infra text accompanying notes 63-68.
4. Land trusts are private conservation organizations that have a primary purpose of
holding and managing conservation property. The number of land trusts has increased
dramatically since the 1980s. See Bray, supra note 1, at 129 (noting the period of "explosive
growth [of land trusts] beginning in the 1980s"). Land trusts often receive funding from
federal, state, and local government, as well as donations from the public. See WEsT HILL
FOUND. FOR NATURE, THE VALUE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 6 (2002), available at
http://www.landscope.org/rhythmyx/action/conserve/easements/item20493.pdf.
Land
trust organizations accept and manage conservation easement contributions and also
purchase property in fee for conservation purposes. See FAQ: Land Trsts, LAND TRUSI
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conservation tax incentive that allows a property owner to take an
income tax deduction for placing an easement on his or her
property for conservation purposes and giving the easement to the
government or a private environmental organization.' In exchange
for the easement, the property owner may claim a deduction equal
to the conservation easement's value.' At the federal level, this
lucrative incentive yielded $1.22 billion in claimed deductions in
2008 and $2.18 billion in claimed deductions in 2007.' In addition,
many states offer income and property tax incentives to encourage
land conservation.
In general, the idea behind conservation incentives is sound: if
conservation of private land is to succeed, landowners must be
willing participants.9
Nevertheless, the federal income tax
ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtrustalliance.org/conservation/landowners/faqs-1/faq-landtrusts (last visited Nov. 17, 2011). In order to accept deductible easement contributions, a
land trust (or other conservation organization) must be "organized or operated primarily or
substantially" for a conservation purpose (as defined in the Internal Revenue Code and
regulations). Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (as amended in 2009). The Land Trust Alliance
is the umbrella organization for the land trust industry and provides valuable information
and publications about conservation and land trusts. See About, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE,
http://www.landtnistalliance.org/about (last visited Nov. 17, 2011).
5. See I.R.C. § 170(h) (2006). Technically, the contribution must be given to a "qualified
organization." I.R.C. § 170(h) (3). Federal tax law also provides for estate and gift tax
incentives with respect to conservation easements.
See I.R.C. §§ 2031(c), 2522(d).
Discussion of these benefits is outside the scope of this Article; however, the impact of the
proposals made in Parts II and III would have to be taken into account for estate and gift tax
purposes. A number of other distinct tax benefits related to the environment are also
available. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 198 (allowing expensing of environmental remediation costs);
I.R.C. § 512(b)(19) (excluding otherwise taxable gain from certain sales of brownfield
property by exempt organizations).
6. SeeTreas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (as amended in 2009); I.R.C. § 170(h).
7. Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2008, STVr. OF
INCOME BULL., Winter 2011, at 76, 78 (adding the numbers for "conservation easements"
and "facade easements").
Note that the numbers cited do not include corporate
contributions.
8. See DEBRA PENTZ, CONSERVATION

RES. CTR., STATE CONSERVATION TAX CREDITS:

IMPACT AND ANALYSIS (2007) (listing and comparing twelve state tax credits); Christen Linke
Young, Conservation Easement Tax Credits in Environmental Federalium, 117 YALE L.J. POcKET

PART 218, 220 (2008) ("[P]rograms in states like Colorado and South Carolina cast the
widest net, granting credits to any easement donor that qualifies for the federal tax
deduction."); see alo COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 39-22-522(2) (West 2007 & Supp. 2007); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 12-6-3515 (2010); VA. CODE ANN. § 58.1-512 (West 2011). Some states also
provide lower property tax rates for conservation land. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STvr. ANN. § 105277.15 (West 2009); OR. REv. STATr.§ 271.785 (West 2007).
9. Over sixty percent of land in the United States is privately owned. RUBEN N. LUBOwsKI
ET AL., ECON. RESEARCH SERV., U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIC., ECONOMIC INFORMATION BULLETIN No.
14, MAJOR USES OF LAND IN TI-IE UNITED STATES, 2002 35 (2006). Eminent domain or

voluntary purchases for conservation purposes on a massive scale are not realistic options.
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deduction for conservation easements, 0 though often utilized and
praised, is also maligned. On the positive side, the incentive is
credited with protecting millions of acres from development." On
the negative side, the incentive is disparaged as difficult to
administer, prone to abuse,12 and ill-suited to securing conservation
ends.'3 Accordingly, in recent years, a number of proposals have
been made to reform the incentive." There are also defenders of

Land use decisions by private landowners are therefore essential to conservation goals. See
Chris Glenn Sawyer, Preface to AMANDA SAUER, THE VALUE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
THE IMPORTANC. OF PROTECTING NATURE AND OPEN SPACE, at ii (2002) (stating that "we
have increasingly come to the conclusion that while some strategic acquisition of land will be
required, the vast majority of land conservation must be accomplished in a manner that
achieves conservation benefits for the nation but leaves the land in private ownership. Public
acquisition is simply too expensive, and beyond that, maintaining these lands in private
ownership is critical to cost-effective long-term stewardship and management as well as to our
culture.").
10. Technically, the conservation easement deduction is one type of "qualified
conservation contribution." I.R.C. § 170(h). The Internal Revenue Code does not use the
term "conservation easement," but rather allows a deduction for a contribution of an interest
in real property for "a restriction (granted in perpetuity) on the use which may be made of
the real property" where such contribution is made "exclusively for conservation purposes."
Id.
11. See THE NATURE CONSERVANCY, CONSERVATION EASEMENTS:
CONSERVING LAND,
WATER AND A WAY OF LIFE (2003),
available at http://www.nature.org/aboutus/

privatelandsconservation/conservationeasements/conserving-a wayofjlife.pdf (discussing
the success of conservation easements in protecting wildlife habitats and open space and
noting the growing popularity of conservation easements as an effective conservation tool);
Bray, supra note 1, at 124-25 (noting that, as of 2005, state and local land trusts hold
conservation easements protecting over 6.2 million acres); see also McLaughlin, supra note 2,
at 1, 5-6 (stating that "[t]he tax incentives have worked remarkably well" and showing the
growth in land trusts and acres under conservation protection).
12. See infra notes 50-58 and accompanying text.
13. John D. Echeverria, Regulating Versus PayingLand Owners to lrotect the Environment, 26J.
LAND RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 38 (2005) (discussing how "widespread use of voluntary
easements appears to threaten the viability of the regulatory tool as a matter of policy, and
perhaps ultimately the legal availability of this tool."); Julia D. Mahoney, PerpetualRestrictions
on Land and the Problem of the Future, 88 VA. L. REV. 739, 744 (2002) (concluding that

conservation easements "may further the interests of members of the present generation at
the expense of future generations").
14. See STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TH CONG., OPTIONS TO IMPROVE TAX
COMPLIANCE AND REFORM TAX EXPENDITURES 277-87 (Comm. Print 2005) [hereinafter

JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION] (proposing elimination of the incentive in some cases and
reduction in its value in others); Daniel Halperin, Incentives for Conservation Easements: The
Charitable Deduction or a Better Way, 74 LAW & CONTEMP. PROis. 29, 32 (2011) (advocating a

new approach that "would require a governmental entity or a land trust meeting certain
minimum standards to certify the public benefit of [conservation easement transactions]"
and convert the deduction to a grant program); Gerald Korngold, Solving the Contentious
Issues of Pivate Conservation Easements: PromotingFlexibilityfor the Future and Engagingthe Public

Land Use Process, 2007 UTAH L. REV. 1039, 1084 (2007) (discussing five principles and
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the incentive.'1 To the extent there is consensus, it is perhaps the
narrow one that conservation is important, perhaps critically so, but
the current approach to encouraging conservation is imperfect.
Frequently missing from this debate, however, is a focus on how
to measure the value of conservation. "Conservation" is often
described in generalities: a vague environmental goal or value,
worth whatever it takes.' 6 To a certain extent, this is commonplace.
A value, whether of conservation or otherwise, is cultural, and a
matter of policy, or assertion. One either shares the value or not.
But sharing the value of conservation does not, as a general matter,
answer the question of what conservation means and how it should
be measured.
Indeed, ever since the conservation easement tax expenditure 7
became a permanent fixture in the Internal Revenue Code ("the
Code"),"' the importance of conservation has largely been taken for
suggesting five related reforms related to the "perpetual nature, rigidity, and nonpublic
attributes" of conservation easements). See generallyJEFF PIDOT, REINVENTING CONSERVATION
EASEMENTS:
A CRITICAL EXAMINATION AND IDEAS FOR REFORM (2005), available at
https://www.lincolninst.edii/pubs/dl/1051_Cons%20Easements%20PFROl3.pdf (analyzing
issues that concern conservation easements and describing potential reforms); Josh Eagle,
Notional Generosity:

Explaining Charitable Donors' High Willingness to Part with Conservation

Easements, 35 HARv. ENVTL. L. REv. 47 (2011) (suggesting that the conservation easement tax
deduction might be abolished in favor of a spending program, or that conservation
easements should be converted to development rights, transferable by the donee
organization); Owley, supra note 2 (citing a need for more "holistic" conservation planning
efforts and arguing for renewable term conservation easements instead of perpetual
easements).
15. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin & Mark Benjamin Machlis, Protecting the Public Interest
and Investment in Consemation: A Response to Professor Korngolds Critique of Conservation

Easements, 2008 UTAH L. REv. 1561 (2008) (discussing misconceptions in criticisms of
conservation easements and pointing out the potential adverse impact of several suggested
reforms).
16. See, e.g., PEW RESEARCII CTR. FOR PEOPLE & THE PRESS, BEYOND RED VS. BLUE:

POLITICAL TYPOLOGY 14 (2011) (finding that seventy-one percent of the general public think
that "this country should do whatever it takes to protect the environment").
17. A tax expenditure is a term that describes an incentive program in which tax
benefits-relative to "normal" tax treatment-are used to encourage or reward behavior.
Colloquially, a tax expenditure often is referred to as "spending" through the tax code. See,
e.g., C. EUGENE STEUERLE, CONTEMPORARY U.S. TAx

POLICY 293 (2008)

expenditures as "[slpending programs channeled through the tax system").

(defining tax

See generally

STANLEY S. SURREY & PAUL R. McDANIEL, TAX EXPENDITURES 25-27 (1985); STANLEY S.
SURREY, PAITIWAYS TO TAX REFORM: THE CONCEPF OF TAx EXPENDITURES (1973) (serving as

a classic work on tax expenditures); J. Clifton Fleming Jr. & RobertJ. Peroni, Reinvigorating
Tax ExpenditureAnalysis and Its InternationalDimension, 27 VA. TAX REv. 437 (2008) (providing

a recent assessment of tax expenditures).
18. Congress made the conservation easement tax expenditure a permanent part of the
Code in 1980. See infra Part II.A (providing a synopsis of the legislative history of the
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granted. But what is the value of conservation, and, in particular,
what is the value of the conservation easement tax expenditure?
What are the benefits? Do the costs of the program exceed the
benefits? These are important questions to ask of any tax or
spending program, and are especially important now in light of the
wider discussion about the value of tax expenditures.'9
Accordingly, it is time for an assessment of the conservation
easement tax expenditure-should the program be kept, modified,
or eliminated?
This Article first undertakes to provide such an assessment by
considering the costs and benefits of the program. Part I of the
Article finds that, although it is feasible to assess program costs, a
comparable evaluation of program benefits is not possible because
there is no good measure for conservation benefits. As Part I
reveals, conservation value is, to a certain extent, unknown and
misunderstood, making it difficult to verify the accuracy of the
prevailing background assumption that the benefits of the
easement program exceed the costs.
Critically, this background assumption can be traced to an
overlooked aspect of the incentive; namely, that the tax benefit
received by the donor is not directly related to the conservation
value of the contributed easement. As discussed in Parts I and II,
this is exceptional. Normally, in the charitable contribution
context, a direct relationship exists between the benefit to the
donor and the benefit to charity.20
But with conservation
easements, the tax benefit is not based on the benefit to charity
(the easement's conservation value), but rather is based on the lost
economic development value represented by the easement.
The mismatch between the tax benefit and conservation value
means that the measure for the benefit under present law is both
erroneous and harmful. Because the easement value has come to
be identified by taxpayers and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS")
with lost economic development value, conservation has been

program). References to "the Code" are to the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended.
19. Currently, tax expenditures are a focal point of discussions about tax reform and
deficit reduction. For example, one leading proposal has advocated for the elimination or
substantial curtailment of many tax expenditures.
See NAT'L COMM'N ON FiscAL
RESPONSIBILlY AND REFORM, TiIE MOMENT OF TRUTil 15, 28-34 (2010).
20. See infra Part I.B.
21.

See infra Part I.A.
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Undue attention and resources have been placed
undermined.
on divining a largely fictional, subjective, and misleading number.
Further, this misplaced focus has inhibited the ability to assess the
effectiveness of the program and hindered the development of
standards for, and an understanding of, the conservation value of
easements.
Accordingly, Part II of the Article argues for an alternative
measure of the tax benefit. The new measure should, in theory, be
based on the conservation value of the easement. However,
because conservation value is difficult to quantify, other measures
should be considered. The Article weighs two: one based on a
percentage of the fair market value of the entire property interest,
and another based on a percentage of the donor's cost-basis in the
property. While either measure should reduce waste and abuse
and allow for a better focus on conservation value, on balance,
using a percentage of the value of the entire property interest likely
would make for a stronger incentive. Part II also argues that the
charitable deduction model for conservation easements is flawed
and that the deduction should be converted to a credit.
Part III of the Article then takes up the question of how reforms
to the easement program, including possible conversion to a credit,
should be designed. This Part argues that to better promote
conservation and to minimize waste and abuse, there should be,
among other reforms, different levels of tax benefits that depend
upon the satisfaction of rules designed to secure conservation ends,
tighter standards for conservation purposes, elimination of any tax
benefit for certain types of easements, and tougher standards on
land trust eligibility. Part III also avers that the role of the federal
tax incentive should, as a general matter, be secondary to state and
local incentives, at least in the absence of a strongly articulated
federal conservation policy. In other words, absent such a policy,
the federal tax incentive should be designed in such a way as to
encourage the development of conservation standards and
conservation decisions at a more local level.
At the end of the day, conservation is best understood as a land
use issue, not a tax issue. Important conservation uses may be
underrepresented in a system of property law that values
development as the highest and best use of the land. Accordingly,
tax and other programs to foster conservation generally make
22. See infra Part II.B.1.
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sense. However, conservation should be more than a word evoking
warm feelings and amorphous benefits. Although quantifying
conservation is difficult, the conservation easement tax expenditure
should be designed to pursue more than a vague notion of
conservation.
The expenditure should be the result of a
considered policy that promotes and encourages a theory of
conservation value such that, ideally, the judgment can reasonably
be made that conservation is the best use of a property.
I. ASSESSING THE VALUE OF THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT TAX

EXPENDITURE
What is the value of the federal conservation easement tax
expenditure? Do the costs of the program exceed the benefits of
conservation?
Often, the question is phrased in terms of
efficiency.2 In general, a tax expenditure is efficient if benefits
exceed costs and inefficient otherwise.
There are, of course,
degrees of efficiency. An efficient program can be made more
efficient by reducing costs and therefore increasing the ratio
between benefits and costs. The greater this ratio is, the more
efficient the program.
Efficiency also depends upon
responsiveness or causation-that is, the extent to which
contributions are made because of the incentive and would not
But regardless of degrees of
have been made otherwise.
efficiency, at a minimum, benefits must exceed costs for a program
to be considered successful.
Measuring easement program costs and conservation benefits is
easy in some respects and difficult in others. The main point of the
analysis here, however, is not to devise a precise estimate or even
reach an unequivocal conclusion as to efficiency, but rather to
23. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 92 (stressing the importance of efficiency in deciding
whether to add (at the time) additional incentives to the easement donation program); see
also OFFICE OF TAx ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, A REPORT TO THE CONGRESS ON
THE USE OF TAx DEDUCl'ONS FOR DONATIONS OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTS 1-2 (1987)

[hereinafter REPORT TO CONGRESS]. For example, if the government provides one dollar of
subsidy, the expectation is that the subsidized party will produce at least one dollar of good.
If the dollar's worth of subsidy produces less than one dollar's worth of good, then the
subsidy is inefficient. If the dollar's worth of subsidy produces one dollar or more worth of
good, then the subsidy is efficient.
24. See, e.g., Fleming & Peroni, supra note 17, at 444-45 (stating that the "principal
purpose and justification" of tax expenditure analysis is its "role as a triggering mechanism
for mandatory recasting and cost/benefit analysis").
25. McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 18-19.
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identify what can be said about costs and benefits and what that
reveals about assessing the overall value of the program.
A. Costs to the Government, Other Costs
Beginning on the cost side, one cost to consider is the amount of
tax revenue lost as a result of the easement program. The IRS
records the amount individual taxpayers claim as federal income
tax conservation easement deductions.
For instance, in 2008,
individuals claimed approximately $1,216,043,000, or $1.21 billion,
as deductions. In 2007, the number was $2,176,391,000, or $2.18
billion.28 The table below shows the amounts claimed from 2003 to
2008.
The reported numbers, however, reflect the claimed value of the
easements contributed, not the amount of tax revenue lost. To
determine lost tax revenue, the top marginal tax rate of the donor
must be multiplied by the amount deducted. If a tax rate of thirtyfive percent3 is assumed for all donations in years 2008 and 2007,
the lost tax revenue for contributions by individuals for each year
would be $425,615,000 and $761,737,000, respectively. The last
column of the table shows lost tax revenue for each of the years
26. Because corporate contributions are not included, the total deductions are
understated, perhaps significantly.
27. Liddell & Wilson, supra note 7, at 76. The IRS separately lists amounts for
conservation easements and for facade easements. A fatade easement generally is a subtype
of conservation easements, in which the facade of a private property is protected from
change.
See I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(C)(ii) (2006) (defining the term "certified historic
structure"); see alo infra notes 51, 58 and accompanying text (describing how facade
easements are abused).
28. Liddell & Wilson, supra note 7, at 78; Pearson Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual
Noncash Contributions,2007, STAT. OF INCOME BuLL., Spring 2010, at 52, 53.
29. Liddell & Wilson, supra note 7, at 78; Liddell & Wilson, supranote 28, at 53; Pearson
Liddell & Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2006, STAT. OF INCOME BULL.,
Summer 2009, at 67, 68-69; Janette Wilson, Individual Noncash Contributions, 2005, STAT. OF
INCOME BULL., Spring 2008, at 68, 69; Janette Wilson & Michael Strudler, Individual Noncash
Contributions, 2004, STAT. OF INCOME BULL., Spring 2007, at 77, 78; Janette Wilson & Michael
Strudler, Individual Noncash Charitable Contributions, 2003, STAr. OF INCOME BULL., Spring
2006, at 58, 58-60. Of course, the time frame for measuring and comparing the costs and
benefits is important. The very nature of conservation easements and perpetual protection
suggests that the benefits of the program are ongoing, so any particular snapshot of costs
and benefits may be superficial.
30. The thirty-five percent rate is currently the top marginal rate of tax. Rev. Proc. 201112, 2011-2 I.R.B. 297. An exact estimate of revenue cost would require knowing the top tax
rate of each donor claiming the deduction. Using a thirty-five percent rate here provides an
estimate that is likely higher than actual revenue loss, considering that some taxpayers
probably are not paying tax at the top marginal rate.
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covered (again, assuming a thirty-five percent rate), for a total of
$3,573,820,000, or $3.6 billion, over the six-year period.
TABLE

Year

1:

FEDERAL INCOME TAx CONSERVATION EASEMENT DEDUCTIONS

Conservation
Easements

Facade Easements

Conservation &
Facade
Easements
Combined

Total Revenue
Loss
(assuming a
35% marginal
tax rate for all
donors)

2,407 Donations
2003

NA

NA

$522,173,000

2,179 Returns

$1,491,924,000
Claimed

3,365 Donations
2004

NA

NA

$507,224,000

2,971 Returns
$1,449,210,000
Claimed

1,132 Donations

3,439 Donations

2,186 Returns

1,028 Returns

3,214 Returns

$1,815,814,000
Claimed

$307,370,000
Claimed

$2,123,184,000
Claimed

3,529 Donations

1,145 Donations

4,674 Donations

2,307 Donations
2005

2006

2007

2008

3,402 Returns

1,143 Returns

4,545 Returns

$1,489,589,000
Claimed

$264,575,000
Claimed

$1,754,164,000
Claimed

2,405 Donations

242 Donations

2,647 Donations

2,231 Returns

228 Returns

2,459 Returns

$1,954,122,000
Claimed

$222,269,000
Claimed

$2,176,391,000
Claimed

3,158 Donations

1,396 Donations

4,554 Donations

3,095 Returns

1,180 Returns

4,275 Returns

$1,177,753,000

$38,290,000

$1,216,043,000

Claimed

Claimed

Claimed

$743,114,000

$613,957,000

$761,737,000

$425,615,000
_

Another cost to be considered is the market value lost when land
is used for a conservation purpose in perpetuity, otherwise known
as the lost economic development value resulting from easement
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One measure of such cost is the amount claimed
contributions.'
as deductions. Under the Code and Treasury Regulations, the
amount deducted (which is deemed the fair market value)32
typically is determined using the before-and-after valuation
method." This means that the property is first valued before the
conservation restriction and then valued after the conservation
restriction. The difference between the two (usually but not
necessarily a positive number) 34 represents the market value taken
away from the property because of the restriction. In other words,
under the tax law, the restriction has a negative value. Thus, the
holder of the conservation restriction often is understood as the
holder of the "development rights.""5 Adding up the total amounts
deducted from the above table, the lost economic development
value from conservation easements during the period 2003 through
2008 would be equal to $10.21 billion.
Although the amount claimed as deductions provides a starting
point for determining the lost economic development value
stemming from the conservation easement program, arguably it
should be discounted-and perhaps by a significant percentage.
This is because the lack of a sales market for conservation
easements provides reason to doubt that the before-and-after
31. The lost economic development value has been termed the "market cost" of the
donation. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 24 (defining market cost as "the reduction in the
fair market value of the land that results from placing permanent restrictions on its
development and use").
32. Donors generally are allowed to deduct the fair market value of contributed property.
I.R.C. § 170; Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3) (as amended in 2009).
33. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h) (3)(i) (as amended in 2009) (providing that if, as is usually
the case, there is "no substantial record of market-place" easement sales available, then "the
fair market value of a perpetual conservation restriction is equal to the difference between
the fair market value of the property it encumbers before the granting of the restriction and
the fair market value of the encumbered property after the granting of the restriction"); see
also C. Timothy Lindstrom, A Guide to the Tax Aspects of Easement Contributions, 7 Wo. L. REV.
441, 485 (2007) ("The value of the easement for purposes of the deduction is typically the
difference in the value of the easement property before the contribution and after the
contribution.").
34. The regulations make clear that an easement may enhance the value of the property.
Treas. Reg. §1.170A-14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009) ("[T]here may be instances where
the grant of a conservation restriction ... may in fact serve to enhance, rather than reduce,
the value of the property.").
35. Adrienne Lyles-Chockley, Building Livable Places: The Importance of Landscape in Urban
Land Use, Planning, and Development, 16 BUFF. ENvri.. L.J. 95, 119 (2008) ("Private

organizations may also take advantage of conservation easements (i.e., development rights),
legal agreements in which a property owner restricts the type and amount of development
that may take place on a particular property.").
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method produces an accurate picture of the lost development
36
value. As has been documented, without such a market there is
no "market price" for easements.17
Thus, the value of a
conservation easement becomes less clearly objective and more
dependent on the quality and integrity of appraisers, who are
typically paid by the taxpayer-donor and not entirely
independent."
To make the valuation problem worse, the incentives for the
taxpayer and the donee organization align toward a higher
valuation. For the taxpayer, a higher valuation means a larger
deduction (and so a bigger tax benefit); for the donee
organization, a higher valuation signals a more valuable easement,
in that more development activity is restricted. The result is that
36. The lost economic development value, represented by the claimed fair market value
of the contributed easements, should be further discounted to take into account the
easement donations that would have occurred in the absence of the tax incentive.
Accordingly, the lost economic development value associated with contributions that would
have been made anyway should not be considered a cost of the easement program. See
REPORi TO CONGRESS, supra note 23, at 8-9; McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 18 (discussing the
"responsiveness" of the incentive and concluding that although many contributions are
made because of the incentive, it is not clear how many are and how many are not). The
same point applies on the benefit side of the equation. See LAND TRUsTr ALLIANCE, 2005
NATIONAL LAND TRUST CENSUS REPORT 8-9 (2006), available at http://www.landtrust
alliance.org/land-trusts/land-trust-census/2005-national-land-trust-census/2005-report.pdf
(discussing the growth of private land conservation and the factors that have played a role in
that growth, public tax incentives among them).
37. SeeJohnston v. Comm'r, 74 T.C.M. (CCH) 968 (1997) (noting that "there is rarely an
established market from which to derive fair market value" for contributed easements);
Christopher Serkin, Entrenching Environmentalism: Pivate Consemation Easements over Public

Land, 77 U. CI. L. REv. 341, 360 (2010) ("There is no ready market for conservation
easements.").
38. Taxpayers are required to obtain an appraisal for contributions of more than $5000
and provide a summary of the appraisal on their tax return. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) (C) (2006).
For contributions of more than $500,000, the appraisal itself must be attached to the return.
I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(D). The appraisal must be performed by a "qualified appraiser" who has
relevant education and experience. I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(E). In 2004 and 2006 Congress
enacted new legislation (in which the author was involved) intended to provide more
uniformity and rigor for appraisals and appraisers. See Pension Protection Act of 2006, Pub.
L. No. 109-280, § 1219(c)(1), 120 Stat. 780, 1084-85 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §§
170(f)(11)(E), 6662, 6664, 6695A, 6696 (2009)); American Jobs Creation Act of 2004, Pub.
L. No. 108-357, § 883(a), 118 Stat. 1418, 1631-32 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
170(f)(11)(A)-(H) (2009)). This legislation imposed a new penalty on appraisers for
overvaluations, increased the penalties on taxpayers for overvaluations, and eliminated the
"reasonable cause" defense for some overvaluations. I.R.C. § 6695A (2009). Before the 2006
legislation, there was no requirement that easement appraisers have expertise in what is a
specialized arm of the appraisal field. Nevertheless, there is doubt that the reforms will curb
the main problems. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 44 (concluding that "the restrictions
adopted in 2006 are insufficient and do not come close to dealing with the problem.").

2012]

The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure

13

even well-meaning taxpayers and donee organizations have
incentives to believe bullish assumptions by an appraiser about the
before value." Further, the law provides significant flexibility to
the appraiser. For example, the before value may be based on the
highest and best use of the property, which is not necessarily the
market price for the property, but instead may be the price for the
property assuming that it would be developed.
This is not to say that appraisers are any more prone to engage in
manipulation than other service providers, but that appraising in
the absence of a market is more art than science," and a lot is at
39. See Exempt Organizations: Enforcement Problems, Accomplishments, and Future Direction:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 109th Cong. 166 (2005) (statement of Mark W.

Everson, Comm'r of IRS), available at http://finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/
metest04O5O5.pdf ("Overvaluations are difficult to identify, substantiate and litigate.
Further, donors and the recipient charities do not have adverse interests that would help
establish a correct valuation."); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 72 ("Unless and until an audit is
conducted, the IRS must rely on a one-sided assertion of value by the taxpayer who has a
financial incentive to assert the highest value he thinks he can get away with.").
40. This is not to suggest that the law encourages overvaluation. The regulations require
consideration of "not only the current use of the property but also an objective assessment of
how immediate or remote the likelihood is that the property, absent the restriction, would in
fact be developed, as well as any effect from zoning, conservation, or historic preservation
laws that already restrict the property's potential highest and best use." Treas. Reg. § 1.170A14(h)(3)(ii) (as amended in 2009). However, the before value nonetheless is based on the
"highest and best use." Id. (alluding to "the potential fair market value represented by
highest and best use"); see, e.g., Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (noting that
the highest and best use for a property is the most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future); Robert Wood,
Consemation Easements, Valuation, and Substantiation, 37 REAL EST. TAX'N 132, 134 (2010)
("Notably, the Tax Court takes into account not only the current use of the property, but
also its highest and best use."). One controversial method of valuation, subdivision
development analysis, allows calculation of the before-easement value based on the price a
developer, intending to subdivide it, might pay for the land. See Stephanie Stern, Encouraging
Conservation on Private Lands: A BehavioralAnalysis of FinancialIncentives, 48 ARIz. L. REv. 541,
558 (2006); see also Nancy A. McLaughlin, Questionable Conservation Easement Donations, 18
PROB. & PROP. 40, 45 (2004) ("The [subdivision development] analysis is intended to mimic

the valuation process that would be employed by a prospective purchaser interested in
acquiring the subject land for development. The appraiser first determines the total gross
proceeds that would be realizable if the land were developed to its fullest extent. The gross
proceeds figure is then discounted for the various factors that a prospective developer would
consider, such as the risk and delay associated with obtaining any necessary approvals or
zoning changes, the time it would take to sell the lots, the various costs associated with
developing the property such as marketing, engineering, and infrastructure costs, and,
importantly, the profit that the developer expects to make on the development. That
discounted figure is then presented as the 'fair market value' of the property.").
41. It is almost boilerplate for the Tax Court to announce that valuation "is not a precise
science." See, e.g., Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) 1818 (2009);
Akers v. Comm'r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1113 (1984) ("[V]aluation is not an exact science and
cannot be determined with mathematical precision. It is a subjective determination which
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stake.
Furthermore, although an appraisal can be challenged,
such challenges are costly and may amount to dueling expert
opinions. In the absence of market transactions, such duels may
comprise little more than "he said, she said" type argumentsarguments that a savvy taxpayer with a well-reasoned appraisal often
will win,4 3 and which are resource intensive for the IRS to mount.
Accordingly, the issue of overvaluation has been at the heart of
45
concerns about abuses in the conservation easement program.
Addressing the overvaluation problem should be part of any
reform of the easement program." But for present purposes, the
requires the exercise of our best judgment considering all the facts and circumstances of
record." (citing Messing v. Comm'r, 48 T.C. 502, 512 (1967))).
42. See Scott D. McClure, Steven E. Hollingworth & Nicole D. Brown, Courts to IRS: Ease
Up on Conservation Easement Valuations, 124 TAX NOTES 551, 555 (2009) (providing a table
listing twenty-five easement valuation cases and the dramatic difference in values asserted by
the taxpayer and the IRS). For example, in Kiva Dunes, the taxpayer claimed that an
easement on a golf course was worth $30,588,325, while the IRS expert valued it at
$10,018,000. The taxpayer largely prevailed, with the Tax Court setting the value at
$28,656,004. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1818.
43. As legal practitioners have noted, "easements are an enormously good deal[,]"
especially "for the taxpayer armed with a good appraisal and, if need[] be, a credible
expert[.]" Wood, supra note 40, at 137; see also STEPHEN J. SMALL, FEDERAL TAX LAW OF
CONSERVNION EASEMENTS 1 (3d Supp. 1996-2000) ("[Wlell prepared landowners and
experienced appraisers generally win against a poorly prepared IRS."); McClure,
Hollingworth & Brown, supra note 42, at 555 ("Taxpayers and their advisers should maximize
their chances of success by ensuring that the appraisals substantiating the easement value are
reasonable and well supported. . . ."); Robert Wood, Rich "Consemation Easement" Tax Break

Ends 12/31/11, FORBES (May 4, 2011, 8:34 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/
2011/05/04/rich-conservation-easement-tax-break-ends-123111/ ("[Slome taxpayers have
claimed outsized 40% to 50% deductions. The IRS has taken some of them to court but
hasn't done terribly well. These disputes often come down to dueling appraisers, and
taxpayers can usually afford good ones. Conservation easements can provide attractive tax
benefits to the donor and nice societal benefits too. There are details to be observed and
overly rich appraisals can (and probably should) draw scrutiny. Still, with a properly planned
and documented donation and a deduction that isn't greedy, everyone wins. Get them while
you can.").
44. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 296 ("[Vlaluation is a difficult
and resource intensive issue for the IRS to identify, audit, and litigate.").
45. See, e.g., Steven T. Miller, Comm'r, Tax Exempt and Gov't Entities, Internal Revenue
Serv., Remarks at the Spring Public Lands Conference (Mar. 28, 2006) [hereinafter Remarks
of Steven T. Miller], available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/miller-speech
3_28_06.pdf ("[A]ppraisals of conservation easements often are based on unrealistic
assumptions about the highest and best use of the land, are based on an assumption that the
entire assets are already in place, are conducted without regard to current zoning law, or are
conducted pursuant to inadequate professional standards.").
46. Congress recently enacted changes directed at the valuation problem. See supra note
38. Some commentators acknowledge the valuation problem but are more sanguine than
the author about its scope. See Eagle, supra note 14, at 71 ("[O]bvious and intentional
overvaluation would require the complicity of the taxpayer, the qualified appraiser, and the
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issue is that, to the extent the amount claimed as deductions
overstates the lost development value attributable to easement
contributions, such amount should be discounted to arrive at a
more accurate measure of one cost of the program. Picking a
discount rate here will necessarily be somewhat arbitrary. 7
Nevertheless, as the point of this exercise is more conceptual
guidance than numerical precision, assuming a discount rate of ten
percent (thus, assuming that all easement conservation donations
are overvalued by ten percent) , the lost economic development
value attributable to the easement program with respect to the
period 2003 through 2008 would be approximately $9.19 billion."
In addition to lost tax revenue and lost economic development
value, other costs also should be taken into account. For example,
donee. Although the opportunity for overvaluation is a possible explanation for high
willingness to part [with the easement], it seems fair to assume that the majority of fair
market value estimates for donated easements are calculated in good faith." (citations
omitted)). Others argue that although the scope of valuation abuse is not certain, "it is likely
that the level of abuse will increase as generous state tax incentives combine with the federal
incentives to make an easement donation, coupled with an aggressive or abusive valuation, a
potentially profit-making enterprise." McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 86. The IRS responded
to the valuation problem with an aggressive enforcement strategy, namely to assert a zero
value for many easement contributions. See IRS News Release IR-2004-86 (June 30, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124485,00.html
(announcing the
intent of the IRS to scrutinize easement values); McClure, Hollingworth & Brown, supra note
42, at 555 (noting that in nine of twenty-six easement valuation cases, the IRS asserted a zero
value, but "[t]he court rejected the IRS's zero valuation in each of those cases, assigning
values ranging from $65,860 to $1,992,375."); see abLo Halperin, supra note 14, at 41
(criticizing the Tax Court's rejection of the IRS's zero-value approach). Notwithstanding the
defeats, the fact that the IRS makes zero-value arguments points to serious doubts about the
underlying conservation value of the easement, and is a confession, in effect, that to admit
some value of dubious easements likely opens the door to an even greater loss in court. The
IRS enforcement effort nevertheless continues, to the consternation of land trusts and some
members of Congress.
See, e.g., Fred Stokeld, Senators Concerned About IRS Audits of
Conservation Easements in Colorado, EXEMPT ORG. TAX TODAY, Dec. 31, 2009.

47. Note that the higher the discount rate, the lower the overall cost of the program.
48. In the author's view, this rate is probably conservative considering that taxpayers with
a well-prepared appraisal likely have a reasonable cause defense to the imposition of an
overvaluation penalty. The overvaluation penalty is twenty percent of the underpayment of
tax (increased to forty percent for gross valuation misstatements). I.R.C. §§ 6662(a),
6662(h) (2006). The penalty applies to negligence or disregard of the rules or regulations
and to valuations that result in substantial understatements of tax or valuation misstatements.
I.R.C. § 6662(b). There is a reasonable cause defense to the penalty if the taxpayer acted in
good faith. I.R.C. § 6664(c) (1). The reasonable cause defense is not available, however, for
gross valuation misstatements. I.R.C. § 6664(c)(2); see, e.g., 1982 East, LLC v. Comm'r, 101
T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (2011) (upholding IRS denial of a deduction for a facade easement
claim of $6.6 million but denying imposition of a twenty percent accuracy penalty).
49. This number ($9,189,824,400) was derived by adding the amount claimed in the
fourth column of the table and multiplying by 0.9. See supra Table I and note 29.
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there are administrative costs to the conservation easement
program, including litigation.' Like loss of revenue, administrative
costs are borne largely by the government (and so by taxpayers).
The administrative costs from the conservation easement program
likely are not insignificant, considering that in recent years the IRS
has devoted considerable resources to curbing abuses. Indeed,
easement valuation abuse has been listed as one of the top
problems faced by the IRS."' The current regime has generated
hundreds of audits,5 2 many litigated cases,5 3 and extensive IRS
guidance, -demonstrating a considerable use of enforcement
resources, perhaps disproportionate to other areas given the
50. See infra note 53.

51. I.R.S. News Release IR-2006-25 (Feb. 7, 2006) (listing facade easements as one of the
top abusive tax schemes for 2006); I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-19 (Feb. 28, 2005) (listing
facade easements as one of the top abusive tax schemes for 2005).
52. See Letter from Christopher Wagner, Dep't of the Treasury, -to The Honorable Mark
Udall (Dec. 17, 2009), in 2010 TAx NOTEs TODAY 10, 10-22 (2010) ("We are currently
examining 344 taxpayers for charitable donations of conservation easements .... For fiscal
years 2005 through 2009, we closed examinations on 1,115 taxpayers."); Fred Stokeld, IRS
Has Made Offers to Settle Conseration Easement Exams, Official Says, 65 EXEMPT ORG. TAX REV.
1203 (2010) (noting that the IRS "had offered to settle hundreds of its audits of conservation
easements in Colorado and elsewhere").
53. See, e.g., Comm'r v. Simmons, 646 F.3d 6 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (affirming the Tax Court's
decision that the easement was donated for conservation purposes and that the taxpayer
acquired qualified appraisals of the land); Friedberg v. Comn'r, 102 T.C.M. (CCH) 356
(2011); Schrimsher v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1329 (2011); DiDonato v. Comm'r, 101
T.C.M. (CCH) 1739 (2011); Boltar v. Comm'r, 136 T.C. 326 (2011); Kaufman v. Comm'r,
136 T.C. 294 (2011); 1982 East v. Comm'r, 101 T.C.M. (CCH) 1380 (2011). According to an
IRS official, there are approximately 240 cases currently docketed in Tax Court. E-mail from
Karin Gross, Supervisory Attorney, IRS Office of the Chief, to author (Oct. 31, 2011, 5:40
PM) (on file with author). Other recent notable cases include Class v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 258
(2005), affd, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006) (regarding a taxpayer who claimed a charitable
deduction for the contribution of two small, non-contiguous conservation easements in
separate tax years on the same parcel of land with little or no discernable public benefit and
without encumbering the retained property for development purposes), and Turner v.
Comn'r, 126 T.C. 299 (2006) (finding that a developer erroneously claimed a $342,781
conservation easement charitable deduction on a property adjacent to Mt. Vernon that was
already subject to floodplain restrictions on development). See also McClure, Hollingsworth
& Brown, supra note 42, at 555 (referring to a table of twenty-six valuation cases).
54. See I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, 2004-28 I.R.B. 3, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/
irs-irbs/irbO4-28.pdf (warning about conservation buyer programs); I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem.
200738013 (Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0738013.pdf
(clarifying that taxpayers may not use a percentage of the value of the underlying property as
a rule of thumb in valuing the easement); I.R.S. News Release IR 2004-86 (Jun. 30, 2004),
available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=124485,00.html
("IRS intends to
disallow improper charitable contribution deductions for transfers of easements on real
property to charitable organizations and for transfers of easements in connection with
purchases of real property from charitable organizations.").

2012]

The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure

17

amount of revenue at stake.
Relatedly, the easement program imposes a meaningful
reputational cost" to charitable organizations and to the cause of
conservation. When conservation easements are placed on golf
courses, 56 when self-dealing occurs to generate large deductions for
donors, and when hundreds of thousands (or millions) of dollars
in deductions are claimed to protect the facade of a home from
the
change when local law already prohibits such change,
reputation of land trust alliances, conservancy organizations, and
suffers.
Although
charitable
organizations
even
other
administrative and reputational costs are not readily quantifiable,
they should nevertheless inform estimates of the cost of the
conservation easement program.
Finally, there are considerable transaction costs associated with a
conservation easement contribution that should not be overlooked:
there is the cost of the required appraisal," there are ongoing
monitoring costs by the donee organization, which may include the

55. Reputational cost (if any) is a social cost, borne by the charitable sector and by the
cause of conservation. See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay,

11 FLA. TAX REV. 1, 18-38 (2011) (discussing a recent string of scandals at leading charitable
institutions, including those involving conservation easements, and their effect on the
charitable sector at large).
56. Kiva Dunes Conservation, LLC v. Comm'r, 97 T.C.M (CCH) 1818 (2009); Remarks of
Steven T. Miller, supra note 45, at 5 ("[T]here have been proposals to place conservation
casements on small parcels of land that lie between the holes on a golf course.").
57. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 109TH CONG., REP. OF STAFF INVESrIGATION OF TIHE
NATURE CONSERVANCY 12-13 (Comm. Print 2005); I.R.S. Notice 2004-41, supra note 54
(describing conservation buyer programs as ones in which "the charitable organization
purchases the property and places a conservation easement on the property. Then, the
charitable organization sells the property subject to the easement to a buyer for a price that
is substantially less than the price paid by the charitable organization for the property. As
part of the sale, the buyer makes a second payment, designated as a 'charitable
contribution,' to the charitable organization. The total of the payments from the buyer to
the charitable organization fully reimburses the charitable organization for the cost of the
property.").
58. The particular problem of facade easements has been going on for years. See, e.g.,Joe
Stephens, Senators Vow to End Tax Break on Easements, WASH. POST, Dec. 18, 2004, at A03; Joe
Stephens, Tax Break Turns Into Big Business, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2004, at A01; Joe Stephens,
Loophole Pays Off on Upscale Buildings,WASIi. PosT, Dec. 12, 2004, at A03. Congress addressed

the issue with hearings and legislation, but the response has been viewed by some as
cosmetic, and abuses continue. Still, enforcement efforts persist. See Joe Stephens, U.S.
Targeting Tax Break Tied to Property Use: Fagade Easements Scrutinized, WASH. POST, July 10,
2011, at C01 (reporting on an ongoing enforcement effort by the IRS and the Department of
Justice against one particular land trust, the Trust for Architectural Easements).

59. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 26 nn.92-94 (identifying these significant costs).
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securing of additional contributions,O and there are the legal costs
of drafting the easement and making the gift.
To summarize, in filling in the cost side of the equation, one
should consider revenue loss, lost economic development value
resulting from the use of land for conservation instead of
development, the costs of administering the program, intangible
costs to the reputation of charities and conservation generally, and
transaction costs."
B. Conservation Benefits
With a sense of the costs of the conservation easement tax
expenditure in hand, the question then becomes one of benefits
and a comparison of the two. Coming to an understanding of the
conservation benefits of the easement program is harder, however,
than articulating the costs. How is the conservation benefit to be
defined, and how should it be measured? These are vital, but
vexing, questions.
1. Standard Measures: Number of Acres and Land Trusts
The two most readily available measures of the success of the
conservation easement program are the number of acres affected
by conservation easements and the growth in land trusts.
According to the Land Trust Alliance, "lt]otal acres conserved by
state, local and national land trusts grew to 47 million as of yearend 2010-an increase of about 10 million acres since 2005 and 23
million since 2000."" In addition, the number of acres held by
local and state land trusts and protected by conservation easements
increased from 2,316,064 in 2000, to 6,007,906 in 2005, to
8,833,368 in 2010,64 accounting for fifty-five percent of all land
conserved by such trusts."" While the number of land trusts also

60. Id.
61. Note that costs related to state and local tax benefits are not discussed here. See, e.g.,
Bray, supra note 1, at 146 (noting the cost to state treasuries from state tax credits and
property tax reductions that may result when property is reassessed at a lower value after an
easement is placed on the property).
62. See Korngold, supra note 14, at 1046-48; McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 4-6.
63. LAND TRusT ALLIANCE, 2010 NATIONAL LANI) TRUST CENSUS REPORT 5 (2011)
(emphasis omitted), available at http://www.landtristalliance.org/land-trusts/land-trustcensus/census/.
64. Id. at 5.
65. Id. at 6.
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grew significantly between 2000 and 2005,-by "32%, to 1,667"-_16
"[t]he number of active land trusts has leveled off at 1,723." Still,
one of the most prominent conservancy organizations, The Nature
Conservancy, "helps to protect approximately 15 million acres in
the United States."
By either measure, there is little doubt that the easement
program has been effective in generating easement contributions.""
The difficulty, however, is that neither the number of acres affected
by conservation easements nor the number of land trusts says
much, if anything, about the actual conservation benefits of the
program. In other words, the program's success in developing a
conservation industry does not speak directly to the conservation
value produced by the industry.
2. Easement Value Does Not Equal Conservation Value
In addition to the number of conservation acres and land trusts,

66. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 36, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
67. LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 63, at 5 (emphasis omitted).
68. The Nature Conservancy uses both land acquisition and easement donations. About
Us: 1rivateLands Conservation, TIHE NATURE CONSERVANCY, http://www.nature.org/aboutus/

privatelandsconservation/index.htm (last visited Oct. 25, 2011).
69. As on the cost side, there is the question of responsiveness or causation. As explained
supranote 36, in measuring the efficiency of the program one must identify which easements
are a result of the program and which would have occurred even in the absence of the
program, and then omit the latter from the cost-benefit analysis. Except for subsequent
growth, Professor McLaughlin's assessment of the responsiveness question in 2004 seems
appropriate here as well: i.e., although there is not, and likely never will be, conclusive
evidence of responsiveness, strong circumstantial evidence points to the conclusion that the
tax incentives are responsible for some contributed easements. See McLaughlin, supra note
2, at 49 ("[T]he precise role played by tax incentives in motivating donations, and the level
at which such incentives must be set to trigger donations are all unknown."). Arguably,
however, with the growth in state tax incentives, the increasing awareness of conservation
easements as a recognized conservation tool, and the stability and competence of land trust
organizations as stewards for conservation, federal tax incentives become less influential as
the explanation for easement contributions over time. This raises an important point. It is
sometimes said that tax incentives should be used to develop a nascent industry, and tax
expenditures are often so used. But once an industry "stands up," then the incentives may
be pared back or eliminated. One of the difficulties with tax expenditures, however, is that
they become tax entitlement programs, not subject to annual appropriations, and are often
fiercely protected (and often expanded) by the supported industry. Indeed, and not
surprisingly, the Land Trust Alliance and the land trust community generally are
sophisticated advocates for the tax expenditure. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 44 (noting
the strength of the land trust community); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 6 & n.14 (stating
that lobbying by the land trust community has worked to increase conservation incentives);
Accelerating Ie Pace of Consemation, LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, http://www.landtrustalliance.org/

policy (last visited Nov. 29, 2011).
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there are other possible measures of conservation benefit, the most
obvious of which is the amount claimed as deductions, i.e., the
amount that represents the easement's market value.7 " As shown in
Table 1, the amount deducted during the period 2003 through
2008 was $10,210,916,000, or $10.21 billion.
However, the claimed value of easements for tax purposes is not
the appropriate measure of conservation benefit. Initially, this may
seem counterintuitive. After all, with other kinds of charitable
contributions, the amount deducted generally is equal to the
benefit to charity. For instance, under the general rule of the
charitable contribution deduction, the donor's deduction is equal
to the amount contributed-that is, the fair market value of the
contribution. Thus, if a donor gives $100 in cash, the donor gets
a $100 deduction. The charitable benefit and the deductible
amount are the same-$100.73 The charity may spend the $100 on
helping the needy, on employee salaries, on purchasing a new
building, or the charity may invest the money. But whatever the
charity does with the $100, the amount represents the charitable
The $100 is in the "charitable solution," devoted
good. 7 '
exclusively to charitable purposes, even upon dissolution.
The same generally is true with charitable contributions of
property. If a donor contributes stock in Microsoft worth $100, the
benefit to charity is $100 (whether the charity holds the stock for
investment or sells it) and the deduction generally is also $100.76 If
70. Other efforts to analyze the efficiency of the program have assumed that the amount
deducted is roughly equivalent to the benefits from conservation. See McLaughlin, supra
note 2, at 92-94. Professor McLaughlin's efficiency analysis posits that the program "would
be 'efficient' if the aggregate value of the easements obtained as a result of the incentives ...
exceeds the aggregate cost of the incentives in terms of foregone revenue." Id. at 92.
71. See supraTable 1.
72. See I.R.C. § 170 (2006); Treas. Reg. 1.170A-1 (c) (as amended in 2009).
73. Arcord Halperin, supra note 14, at 38 (noting that for cash gifts the amount
contributed, apart from fundraising costs, is equal to the benefit to charity). The actual tax
savings of course is less ($100 multiplied by the donor's marginal tax rate).
74. It may, and should, be questioned whether the charity's use of the $100 is the best or
most efficient use, resulting in the most charitable good; but such questions go more to
governance or internal operations of the charity, as well as to the definition of "charity"
under the tax law, than to questions of overall efficiency of the tax benefit.
75. Treas. Reg. § 1.501 (c) (3)-1 (b) (4) (as amended in 2008).
76. I.R.C. § 170. There are various limitations depending on whether the property is gain
or loss property, has short-term capital gain, or is inventory property of the taxpayer. I.R.C. §
170(e). Deductions of capital gain property also may not exceed thirty percent of the
taxpayer's contribution base where that taxpayer is an individual. I.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(C).
The extent of deductibility also depends on whether the charity is a public charity or private
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a donor contributes a painting to charity worth $200, the benefit to
charity generally also is $200," whether the charity sells it or hangs
it on the wall. 8 Although there are reasons for arguing that the
deduction in cases of appreciated property generally should not
equal value, 8 the point here is that the benefit to charity generally
is equal to the value of the property for tax purposes. 80
Why then is the amount contributed (the easement's value) not
the measure of the charitable benefit received in the easement
context? As noted above,"' an easement's value for tax purposes is
a negative value. It represents the lost economic development
value from the contribution. Unlike the value of other types of
charitable contributions, easement value says little about the
benefit to charity, or, as described here, the conservation value.
foundation. See I.R.C. § 170(b) (1) (A)-(B).
77. Transaction costs likely will mean that the net benefit to charity is less than $200,
which should be factored into the benefit calculation, and also affect the efficiency calculus
for property contributions generally. Thus, the value of the property and the benefit to
charity often will not be the same. Further, the charity may sell the property at well below
(or above) the amount deducted. But. as a general matter, the value of the property
represents the benefit to charity. Whether the deduction equals fair market value depends
upon the charity's use of the property and the timing of any such sale. I.R.C. §§
170(e)(1)(B), 170 (e)(7).
78. If the charity hangs the painting on the wall, the charity has decided to consume the
painting and is reaping the $200 benefit through use of the property.
79. SeeJoINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 293-307 (considering various options
for reform and proposing a basis deduction for charitable contributions of appreciated
property); Daniel Halperin, A Chaitable Contribution of Appreciated Property and the Realization

of Built-In Gains, 56 TAX L. REV. 1 (2002) (arguing that taxation of built in long-term capital
gains should occur for contributions of appreciated property to charity).
80. Overvalued property, of course, means that the benefit to charity also is overstated.
Note that the fair market value measure of the benefit to charity is not the same as the "social
worth" of the contribution. For example, a contribution of a painting valued at $200 million
does not necessarily produce $200 million worth of social good. But because there is a
market for the painting and its value is known, the market value does represent the benefit
received by the charity because the charity can sell the painting and use the proceeds for
other things, or hang the painting on the wall. In either case, the charity has an asset worth
$200 million.
81. See supra Part I.A.

82. Other commentators have made this point. See Eagle, supra note 14, at 87 ("[T]he
'before and after' valuation method estimates the value of lost development rights ....
However, the value that the public receives for this expenditure is not necessarily correlated
to the value of the development rights. Rather, the public benefit is related to the ecological
or aesthetic value of protecting the land from development."); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at
71 ("[T]he before and after method does not in any way measure the value of those public
goods. Instead, the before and after method measures only the market cost of an easement
donation, or the extent to which placing permanent restrictions on the development and use
of land reduces the fair market value of the land."). However, when the disconnect between
easement and conservation value is mentioned by commentators, it is mostly in passing. See,
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The fact that an easement may be worth $1 million according to
the before-and-after method does not mean that there is a $1
million benefit to charity. For example, if a $1 million easement
protected the habitat of an endangered species, clearly there is a
benefit to charity from the contribution. But the $1 million
valuation reflects what is lost, not the affirmative value of
endangered species protection.
This disconnect between the value of the contribution for tax
purposes and the actual conservation value means that, as an initial
matter, we do not know or even have a ballpark figure to use as an
estimate for the value of the conservation benefit represented by
conservation easements,8 making an efficiency determination even
more challenging than in the normal case.85 In addition, the false
identity of easement value and conservation benefit has meant that,
to a certain extent, the overall efficiency of the easement program
has been taken for granted.8 " Because the normal case of the
e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 71. As discussed infra in Part II, this Article argues that the
issue is important to understanding weaknesses in the design of the conservation easement
tax expenditure.
83. Conservation value is (or should be) based on the value of preserving the species at
risk, and not on the fact that the property may not be developed. Thus, a property could
have a high development value and a low conservation value, or vice versa-the two are not
necessarily linked.
84. Indeed, in light of the uncertainty of the public benefit provided by conservation
easements, Professor Daniel Halperin has concluded that "the revenue loss from the
charitable deductions for easement donations might well be far more than the public benefit
provided." Halperin, supra note 14, at 32 (emphasis added).
85. For instance, normally, the overall efficiency of the charitable deduction depends
more on causation or responsiveness, and less on defining the charitable benefit. To the
extent that a charitable contribution is made because of the tax incentive, the incentive will
be efficient in the broad sense that benefits will greatly exceed costs. For example, if a
contribution of $100 would not have been made but for the charitable deduction, then for a
donor with a thirty-five percent marginal tax rate, the benefit of $100 of charity exceeds the
cost to the government of $35. That is, the government pays $35 to encourage the donation
of $100 to charity-an efficient result. To the extent many charitable contributions would be
made absent the charitable contribution deduction, the deduction becomes less efficient.
Such responsiveness questions are important in the easement context too, but before they
can be assessed, some notion of the conservation benefit and overall efficiency of the
program should first be developed.
86. This type of analysis has been performed in the easement context to justify the
program. See, e.g., PENwZ, supra note 8, at 19 (stating that a credit based on a percentage of
an easement's value "ensures that there is a significant public benefit for any dollars awarded
as tax credits" because, for example, "when credits are valued at 50-percent of the fair market
value of the donation, the public receives $2 of land protection for every $1 dollar offered as
a tax incentive."); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 92 (illustrating efficiency by saying that if
ninety landowners, each in a thirty-five percent tax bracket, donated easements because of
the tax incentive, and each easement was worth $1 million, then "the tax incentive program
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charitable deduction is reflexively understood and applied to
conservation easement contributions, there has not been enough
focus on the conservation benefits of easements. Indeed, as argued
below, the tendency to equate easement value and conservation
benefit, a tendency influenced by the very design of the easement
program as a charitable contribution, has led to an overemphasis
on easement value by taxpayers, land trusts, and the IRS, often at
the expense of conservation benefits.
3. Conservation Purpose Is Not a Useful Measure of
Conservation Benefit
In order to take a charitable deduction for a conservation
easement contribution, the easement must be "exclusively for
conservation purposes.".
Thus, within the statutory scheme, the
conservation benefit of the contribution is not tied to the value of
the easement but to its purpose. The reason for the conservation
purpose requirement is to describe easements that provide a public
benefit and are therefore worthy of public encouragement.
Accordingly, the conservation purpose requirement could provide
a measure of conservation benefit.
As laid out in the Code and regulations, there are four qualifying
conservation purposes. The first is "the preservation of land areas
for outdoor recreation by, or the education of, the general
public.""8 This includes "the preservation of a water area for the
use of the public for boating or fishing, or a nature or hiking trail
for the use of the public."8 9 The recreation or education must be
"for the substantial and regular use of the general public."90
The second purpose is "the protection of a relatively natural
habitat of fish, wildlife, or plants, or similar ecosystem."9' The
habitat or ecosystem must be "significant" and the life protected
must "normally" live there.9 2 Land areas that have been altered by
human activity qualify, as long as the life protected "continue[s] to

would be efficient because the $90 million value of the easements ... far exceeds the $35
million cost of the program.").
87. I.R.C. § 170(h)(1)(C) (2006).
88. I.R.C. § 170 (h) (4) (A) (i).
89. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (2)(i) (as amended in 2009).
90. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (2) (ii) (as amended in 2009).
91. I.R.C. § 170 (h) (4) (A) (ii).
92. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (3) (i) (as amended in 2009).
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exist there in a relatively natural state.""' Limitations on public
access to the restricted property are allowed.
The third purpose is "the preservation of open space (including
farmland and forest land) where such preservation is (i) for the
scenic enjoyment of the general public, or (ii) pursuant to a clearly
delineated Federal, State, or local governmental conservation
policy, and will yield a significant public benefit."5
"Scenic
enjoyment" is a broad standard evaluated based on the facts and
circumstances of the contribution; eight factors to be considered
are listed." Visual access by the public is sufficient, and the entire
property subject to the easement need not be visible.97
The
requirement of a government conservation policy may be met in
several ways, including "by donations that further a specific,
identified conservation project, such as the preservation of land
within a state or local landmark district that is locally recognized as
being significant to that district,"" or when the donation is made
"pursuant to a formal resolution or certification by a local
governmental agency established under state law specifically
identifying the subject property as worthy of protection for
conservation purposes."99 The "significant public benefit" test is a
"facts and circumstances" test with eleven factors listed in the
regulations as "[a] mong the factors to be considered."'0 0
The fourth and final purpose is "the preservation of an
historically important land area or a certified historic structure."''
A certified historic structure is a building, structure, or land area
that is listed in the National Register or a building located in a
registered historic district and certified by the Secretary of the
Interior as being of historic significance to the district.'o2 Some
visual public access to the restricted property is required. 0 3
For present purposes, what should be apparent from this
recitation of the legal requirements is that the conservation
93. Id.
94. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d) (3) (iii) (as amended in 2009).
95. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4) (A) (iii).
96. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4)(ii)(A) (as amended in 2009).
97. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4) (ii) (B) (as amended in 2009).
98. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(d)(4) (iii) (A) (as amended in 2009).
99. Id.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.170(A)-14(d) (4) (iv) (A) (as amended in 2009).
101. I.R.C. § 170(h) (4) (A) (iv).
102. I.R.C. § 170(h)(4)(C).
103. Treas. Reg. §l.170A-14(d) (5) (iv) (as amended in 2009).
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purpose requirement is broad, open-ended,o and provides little
basis for assessing the conservation benefit of conservation
easements, either in the aggregate or on an easement-by-easement
basis. 05 For example, an easement that provides scenic benefits
may be a legitimate open space easement, but the conservation
value of the scenic benefits will depend upon how much scenery is
protected, the location of the scenery, the extent of public access,
and so on-information not provided through satisfaction of a
purpose requirement. Indeed, this is in the very nature of a
purpose requirement-it is not intended to measure conservation
benefit but merely to provide a broad delineation (and definition)
of conservation.
In general, then, the conservation purpose requirement of the
easement deduction is somewhat akin to the exempt purpose

104. In the wake of highly publicized abuses of the conservation easement tax
expenditure, the standards for conservation purposes have been criticized. Suggestions for
improvement include extending the "significant public benefit" test for open space
easements to all other conservation easements, extending the requirement for some open
space easements that the easement adhere to a governmental conservation policy to all other
conservation easements, and further involving government institutions in the conservation
easement approval process in a manner similar to that required for the preservation of
historically important land areas. SeeJOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 286 ("A
significant public benefit and conservation purpose may be best demonstrated when a
contribution promotes preservation or protection that is pursuant to a clearly delineated
governmental conservation policy."); see abo Korngold, supra note 14, at 1068-69 (proposing
amendments to the Code). All of these suggestions have merit; some are discussed further
in infra Part III.
105. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 286 ("The present-law
[conservation purpose requirements] .. . are so broad that the IRS effectively has no basis to
challenge contributions claimed to have been made for such purposes."); Halperin, supra
note 14, at 42 (noting that the conservation purpose "definition is too open ended");
Korngold, supra note 14, at 1067 (describing the ambiguity in the "conservation purpose"
requirement, particularly the lack of clarity in the qualification requirements for the "open
space" deduction); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 52 ("[W] hile the conservation purposes test
does contain some objective standards, a significant number of the standards are
unavoidably subjective." (citation omitted)). To a certain extent, conservation purpose has
been left to the donor and donee to determine. Although the burden to prove conservation
purpose is on the taxpayer, there is clearly considerable flexibility in the requirements.
Appraisers will not be focused on conservation purpose, but on lost economic development
value. The best guarantee that an easement will provide conservation benefits lies in its
acceptance by a conservation organization. Land trusts in theory (and probably also in
practice) should not accept easements with little or no conservation value. This is an
important check, which has led some to suggest mandatory accreditation for land trusts and
other measures. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 109TH CONG., supra note 57, at 1152. The
Land Trust Alliance has developed a voluntary accreditation program. Getting Accrediled,
LAND TRUST AcCREDITATION COMM'N, http://www.landtrustaccreditation.org/the-process

(last visited Oct. 30, 2011) (giving an overview of the accreditation process).
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requirement for tax exemption as a charitable, or section
501(c) (3), organization. 06 The goal is not to define conservation
(or charity) with rigor, but to adopt a pluralistic approach that
allows private organizations to decide within broad parameters the
limits of charity and conservation.'07 And perhaps this is the best
way to view conservation purpose-it is not a measure of efficiency
for the tax incentive any more than the exempt purpose
requirement of section 501 (c) (3) is a measure of efficiency for tax
exemption as a charity.
4. Quantifying Conservation Benefit?
There should be little doubt that conservation produces
significant benefits; the challenge is quantifying the benefits. Some
studies emphasize this issue, putting the language of conservation
benefits into terms of investment and returns: "To protect the
open space that sustains natural processes is the most important
investment we can make, yielding returns that can be measured in
terms of clean air and water, medicinal discoveries, flood control,
artistic inspiration, fertile soils, hunting grounds, and a stable

106. See I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (requiring that such organizations be "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational
purposes....").
107. It is worth noting here that the conservation purpose requirement itself is somewhat
exceptional. For other charitable contributions of property, there is no "charitable purpose"
or related use requirement. Rather, charitable deductions for property contributions
generally are allowed irrespective of purpose. See I.R.C. § 170(c) (defining charitable
contribution as "a contribution to or for the use of" certain organizations, without a purpose
requirement). But see I.R.C. § 170(c)(1) (requiring that contributions to government
Although property-based distinctions
entities be "exclusively for public purposes").
frequently are made, such distinctions are for determining the deductible amount, not
threshold eligibility. For example, the amount of the deduction is affected by whether the
contributed property is gain or loss property, whether the nature of the gain is ordinary or
capital, whether the property is for a tise related to the exempt purposes of the donee, and,
in some cases, specific types of property (e.g., intellectual property, vehicles, taxidermy,
computers, fractional gifts) have special rules on the deductible amount. I.R.C. §§ 170(e),
170(f)(12), 170(f)(15)-(16), 170(m), 170(o). But for all of these, the purpose of the
contribution does not affect the threshold question of whether or not the contribution is
deductible. So why do conservation easements have a purpose requirement? Congress in
effect was forced into a conservation purpose requirement for easement contributions
because allowing a conservation easement deduction at all is an exception to the general
rule that denies deductions for contributions of partial interests in property. I.R.C. §
170(f)(3). Accordingly, to make a viable exception to the partial interest rule, a purpose
requirement was needed; otherwise, any partial interest contribution would be eligible. For
a description of the partial interest rule, see also infra Part II.A.
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climate." 0 8 The benefits of protecting timberland, for example, are
extensive: improved air quality (and therefore human health),
flood prevention, carbon sequestration, improved water quality,
recreational benefits, increased property values, and scenic
benefits.'09 The problem lies in giving "a monetary value ... to
natural processes and benefits that are not generally recognized by
economic markets[.]""o
Although economists have developed
methods for "deriv[ing]
economic value from ecosystem
services,""' the time when "ecological services and open space
benefits [are brought] into the marketplace, so that they will be
incorporated into decisions affecting their future . . . appears to be
a long way off.""
In some cases, the economics are clear. For example, when a
government chooses to conserve a forest for its water purification
benefits rather than develop the land and incur the costs of
building, operating, and maintaining a water treatment plant,
many costs and benefits can be measured and assessed.' '1 However,
a detailed assessment of the costs and benefits of possible land use
is not required, and may not be feasible, in connection with the
conservation easement tax expenditure. Indeed, the easement
program is partly set up to avoid such studies, designed as it is to
facilitate private transactions" 4 at government expense.
As
108. AMANDA SAUER, THE VALUE OF CONSERVATION EASEMENTs:
PROTECTING NATURE AND OPEN SPACE 2 (2002).

THE IMPORTANCE OF

109. Id.
110. Id. at 4.

111. Such methods include comparing property values of land with open space benefits
to comparable land without such benefits, asking people in surveys how much they would
pay for ecological benefits, and calculating the time and money spent in pursuit of
conservation-related recreational opportunities. Id.
112. Id. at 5.
113. Id. at 5-6 (describing as one example the decision by New York City "to spend $1.8
billion to protect 80,000 acres of its upstate watershed instead of constructing an $8 billion
water filtration plant with additional operating costs of $300 million a year").
114. There is some debate about whether the role of the land trust in conservation is
public or private. Some argue that the conservation easement program fundamentally is
private. Land trusts are viewed as private organizations, making permanent decisions about
public use. This gives rise to accountability concerns: land trusts are not run by elected
officials and are not accountable to the general public. See Korngold, supranote 14, at 106465; C. Timothy Lindstrom, Conservation Easements, Common Sense and the Charitable Trust

Doctrine, 9 WYO. L. REv. 397, 401, 409-10 (2009). Others counter that because land trusts are
section 501(c) (3) organizations under the Code, they are quasi-public-supported by the tax
system, organized for public purposes, and subject to oversight by the IRS and state attorneys
general-and, as "public" charities, land trusts are accountable to donors for their actions.
See Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks, Hicks v. Dowd, ConservationEasements, and the
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suggested in Part III, to the extent possible, implementing a costbenefit analysis into the conservation easement program would be
a step in the right direction toward standardizing the quantification
of conservation benefits so as to make assessment of conservation
benefits more plausible.
5. Conclusion
If the federal government spent $100 for $75 to be paid to
charity, the transaction would be inefficient, wasteful, and the
government (and the public) would be better off without it.
Sometimes called transactional efficiency," 5 this concept can be
applied broadly to an entire program and used to assess its utility.
In general, with respect to the conservation easement tax
expenditure, it largely has been taken for granted that the benefits
of the program exceed the costs, in part because of the rarely
examined assumption that an easement's value for tax purposes is
roughly equivalent to its conservation benefits."
However, the relationship between easement value and
conservation benefits is tenuous. Further, the standard measures
cited for success of the easement program (the number of acres
subject to conservation easements and the growth in the number of
land trusts) are not helpful measures of conservation benefits, nor
is the legal requirement that easements be for one of four broad
conservation purposes. In short, although an articulation of the
costs of the conservation easement tax expenditure is possible and
plausible, a quantifiable articulation of the benefits is elusive if not
ephemeral. This is troubling, if only because the uncertainty
regarding conservation benefits makes assessing the efficacy of the
Charitable Tnst Doctrine: Setting the Record Straight, 10 WYo. L. REV. 73, 95-96. (2010). As
discussed infra note 207 and accompanying text, this debate is also part of the debate about
the soundness of the perpetuity requirement for deductibility. In addition, this "publicprivate" debate has wider ramifications than land trusts. See generally EVELYN BRODY &JOIIN
TYLER, How Punuc Is PRIVATE PHILANTHIIROPY?: SEPARKIlNG REALITY FROM MYHII (2009)
(questioning the argument that the public purposes of a charity warrant extensive public
intervention). As a general matter, many, if not most, charitable organizations likely would
bristle at the notion that they are anything but independent, private organizations. Indeed,
the ongoing debate about the role of the IRS in nonprofit governance, and the considerable
concern expressed by the charitable, "independent" sector about IRS overreach suggests that
charitable organizations are viewed as mostly private. SeeJamesJ. Fishman, Stealth Preemption:
The IRSs Nonprofit Corporate Governance Initiative, 29 VA. TAX REV. 545, 549-57 (2010)
(detailing state and federal regulatory regimes of charitable nonprofits).
115. See infra note 181.

116. See supra note 86 and accompanying text.
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tax expenditure for conservation easements very difficult, and
continuation of the tax expenditure, in part, a matter of faith or
inertia.
As argued in Part II, conservation may, to a certain extent,
warrant relaxing efficiency norms. Nevertheless, the efficiency
analysis discussed here, and the impotence of current notions of
conservation benefit, argue in favor of reforming present law to
develop rules that are more likely to produce greater confidence
that the conservation benefits resulting from the program justify
the significant costs.
II.

TOWARD A TAX BENEFIT GROUNDED IN CONSERVATION VALUE

In any reform of the conservation easement tax expenditure, the
focus should be on determining the optimal level of cost for the
desired conservation benefits. In some cases, it might make sense
to increase the tax incentives found in present law in order to
secure a particularly lucrative conservation benefit. In cases where
the conservation benefits appear weak, however, costs could be
reduced by decreasing the value of the tax incentive, thus
eliminating waste. Key to either approach-eliminating waste or
increasing benefits-is the development of rules that will provide
greater confidence that the conservation benefits, even if not
quantifiable, are actually realized.
The first step toward reform, however, is debunking present law's
emphasis on lost economic development value as the measure for
the tax benefit. As indicated in Part I, unlike other charitable
contributions, the measure for the easement deduction-lost
economic development value-does not bear an approximate
relationship to the benefits provided by the contribution. This
complicates not only the measurement of conservation benefits,
but also raises questions about why lost economic development
value should be the basis for determining the amount of the
deduction.
A. A Brief History of the Enactment of the Easement Deduction
Historical context helps to put the development of the easement
program in perspective. From the outset, the easement program
was embedded within the charitable contribution deduction.
Under traditional property law forms, a conservation easement
generally was not a recognized property interest and so was not
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enforceable."' Nevertheless, as the conservation easement grew in
use, a taxpayer inevitably attempted to deduct a contributed
easement as a charitable contribution."" The IRS ruled that a
deduction was allowed for the fair market value of the conservation
easement. 119

In 1969, however, Congress introduced a rule prohibiting
charitable deductions for contributions of partial interests in
property.so A conservation easement contribution runs afoul of
this rule because, typically, for such contributions, the donor
fragments the property rights by creating and contributing an
easement while remaining the owner of the fee. The donor's
retained fee ownership means that the donor has not contributed
his or her entire interest. But, because conservation easement
contributions were not the intended target of the partial interest
rule, language was added to the conference report that purported
to allow the continued deduction of open view easements.1' This
proved too flimsy a support for a broader deduction, however, and
in 1976 Congress affirmatively waived the partial interest rule for
conservation easement contributions on a temporary basis. 2 2 In
1979, as Congress considered whether to make the tax expenditure
permanent, the Deputy Assistant Secretary for Tax Policy, Daniel
Halperin, testified that the Treasury Department had concerns
regarding easement contributions, declaring that
the difficulties with valuing partial interests in real property may be
particularly acute, especially where such interests have no impact on
the donor's current enjoyment of the property. [In addition], for a
taxpayer who does not have the present intention to sell or develop
the property, the gift of, for example, a conservation easement, while
perhaps diminishing the value of the property, does not do so until a
later time [and] date; in particular, it may have no material impact on
the continuing enjoyment of the property by the donor of the

117. See Korngold, supra note 14, at 1052. This concern was overcome through adoption
in many states of the Uniform Conservation Easement Act. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF COMM'RS
ON UNIFORM STATE LAws, UNIFORM CONSERVATION EASEMENT ACT (1981).
118. Rev. Rul. 64-205, 1964-2 C.B. 62.
119. Id. (allowing a fair market value deduction based on the willing-buyer, willing-seller
standard, but requiring a basis reduction in the retained property).
120. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 201, 83 Stat. 487, 556.
121. See H.R. REi. No. 91-782, at 18 (1969) (Conf. Rep.).
122. See Act to Reform the Tax Laws of the United States, Pub. L. No. 94-455, § 214, 90
Stat. 1520, 1549 (1976).
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Nonetheless, Congress made the conservation easement
deduction permanent in 1980, and also introduced new
requirements for the easement program.12
B. The Problem of Value: A New Measure for the Tax Benefit Is
Needed
1. Lost Economic Development Value Is Not the Right Measure
for the Tax Benefit
The use of the charitable deduction framework for the easement
program meant that a fair market value measure for the deduction
followed as a matter of course.
However, the lack of a true
market value for conservation easements has introduced problems
not only of accurate valuation for deduction purposes-clearly a
scourge of the easement program '2 -but, more fundamentally, has
raised questions about which of multiple values is the right one
upon which to base the tax benefit. Again, to see the issue, it is
helpful to consider a charitable contribution other than a
conservation easement. For example, if a taxpayer donates $100
cash to charity, the deduction is $100 (the value of the
contribution) .
If a taxpayer donates property worth $100, the
deduction is based on the fair market value of the property and
generally is also $100.'" In either case, the deduction is based on
the contribution's value.
As a general matter, contribution value is a sensible starting point
123. Miscellaneous Tax Bills: Hearing on HR. 3874, 4103, 4503, 4611, 4634, and 4968 Before
the Subcomm. on Select Revenue Measures of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong. 12

(1979) (statement of Daniel I. Halperin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Tax Policy,
Department of the Treasury); see aLvo Halperin, supra note 14, at 31-32 (noting that the
problems identified by the Treasury Department in 1979 still remain).
124. An Act to Extend Temporary Tax Provisions, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No.
96-541, § 6(b), 94 Stat. 3204, 3206-08 (1980). Estate and gift tax deductions also are
allowed. I.R.C. §§ 2031(c), 2522(d) (2006). For an excellent and more detailed summary of
the history of the deduction, see McLaughlin, sumra note 2, at 10-17, n.20. For an overview
of the partial interest rule, see Halperin, supra note 14, at 32-36.
125. As a general matter, treasury regulations provide that the fair market value of
contributed property should be determined pursuant to a willing-buyer, willing-seller
standard. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (as amended in 2009).
126. See supra text accompanying notes 51-54.
127. See I.R.C. § 170.
128. Various limitations apply. See id.; supra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
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to measure the deduction, either as a matter of common sense or
simple transactional efficiency, because it represents the benefit to
charity. For instance, under the subsidy theory of the charitable
deduction, 2 assuming that the goal is to encourage charitable
giving, the question is: How much must be paid by the government
to produce the desired level of giving? Here, the desired level of
giving, or the benefit to charity, is the fair market value of the
contributions, i.e., the cash or other property to be donated. The
amount to be paid by the government, the subsidy, is a percentage
of such value.130 The value is relevant because, as a matter of
transactional efficiency,' the subsidy should not exceed 100% of
the contribution value.1 2 Thus, the value of the contribution
129. Pursuant to the subsidy theory of the charitable deduction, a deduction is available
because Congress decided that charitable contributions should be encouraged and
subsidized. In general, tinder the subsidy theory, charitable contributions are a form of
consumption and a personal expense and, therefore, income with respect to the
contributions should not escape tax. Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax
Subsidies: The Role of Distributive justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REv. 505, 517 (2010) (discussing the
subsidy theory and noting that it is the more "common" view);John Simon, Harvey Dale, &
Laura Chisolm, The Federal Tax Treatment of Charitable Organizations, in THE NONPROFIT
SECTOR 267, 274-75 (Walter W. Powell & Richard Steinberg eds., 2006); see also JAMES J.
FISHMAN

& STEPHEN

SCHWARZ,

TAXATION

OF NONPROFIT

ORGANIZATIONS:

CASE AND

MATERIALS 652-53 (2d ed. 2008) ("Congress has justified the charitable deduction like tax
exemptions generally, as an efficient alternative to government support for those nonprofit
organizations providing a public benefit."). Accordingly, the federal government pays a
portion of each charitable contribution (by taxpayers who itemize deductions). See I.R.C. §
63(d). Under another view of the charitable deduction, the income measurement rationale,
it is argued that a taxpayer's income, properly construed, does not include amounts given to
charity. See Simon et al., supra, at 273-74; William D. Andrews, Iersonal Deductions in an Ideal

Income Tax, 86 HARV. L. REV. 309, 313 (1972). Charitable contributions are viewed as
transfers of a consumption opportunity from the taxpayer to the charity and do not
represent consumption by the taxpayer. Therefore, an accurate measurement of the
taxpayer's income does not include charitable gifts, the value of which should not be taxed.
Under an income measurement approach, the proper treatment of charitable contributions
of appreciated property would require realization of the appreciation; otherwise, a
deduction based on the appreciated value offsets other income of the taxpayer, which may
be used for private consumption. See Andrews, supra, at 372.
130. The amount of the subsidy depends upon the contribution amount and the
taxpayer's marginal tax rate, resulting in a larger subsidy for higher income taxpayers. For
example, a contribution of $100 by a taxpayer in the thirty-five percent tax bracket is worth
$35 (100 times 0.35), and a contribution of $100 by a taxpayer in the twenty-eight percent
tax bracket is worth $28 (100 times 0.28). In cases where a fair market value deduction is not
allowed, the deduction is based on cost recovery; that is, the taxpayer recovers their cost
(basis) in the contributed property but is not allowed to deduct the appreciation in the
property. I.R.C. § 170(e). Even here, the deduction may not exceed the fair market value of
the property.
131. See infra note 181.
132. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 40 (noting that revenue loss "should never exceed the
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necessarily is a relevant value for determining the amount of the
deduction. 3 3
As an initial matter, a value-based deduction makes sense for
conservation easements as well. The amount of the subsidy for
conservation contributions should be a percentage of the value of
the benefit to charity. Therefore, it is necessary to determine the
value of the easement. The key question, however, is not whether a
value-based approach to the tax benefit is reasonable, but rather
which of competing values should be used to measure the tax
benefit. In other words, is the fair market value approach of
current law the right approach?

This question of which value to use normally does not arise. For
the typical charitable contribution, there is one relevant value: fair
market value.'3 Fair market value is appropriate for the typical
contribution because it is a reasonable representation of the

benefit to charity.

But "fair market value" does not work in the

easement context. Because fair market value, in effect, has been

defined as the before-and-after value, not only is such value, to a
significant degree, a fiction composed by an appraiser,'13 but more
importantly, as discussed above,'
it bears little relation to the
conservation benefit of the contribution.

In short, conservation easement contributions present a problem
of value not usually present. The question that normally has a
standard answer-what is the value of the benefit received by the
charity?-is not answered by the conventional fair market value
approach. Accordingly, lost economic development value is not
the right measure for the deduction, and its ongoing and largely

unquestioned reign is the crux of the problem with the current
design and administration of the conservation easement program.

actual benefit to charity"). Professor Halperin also explains that if "public benefit is not
commensurate with the revenue loss," one of the rationales for the charitable deductionthat charities are a substitute for government-is not satisfied. Id. at 38.
133. Note that under a subsidy theory for charitable contributions, the form for delivery
of the subsidy as a deduction is not self-evident. A credit could workjust as well, if not better.
Choice of a (below the line) deduction ties the value of the subsidy to the marginal rate of
the taxpayer and limits the deduction to itemizers.
134. As noted, the default regulatory standard for fair market value is based on a
transactional concept, that of a willing buyer and a willing seller. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A1(c) (2) (as amended in 2009).
135. See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
136. See supra Part 1.B.2.
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2. Consequences of Using Lost Economic Development Value as
the Measure
The principal consequence of using lost economic development
value as the measure of the deduction is a basic misunderstanding
and misrepresentation of the conservation benefits of the program.
As discussed in Part I, there is a tendency to equate easement value
with conservation benefit. Such an approach generally is sensible
In truth, however, lost
for other charitable contributions. 37
economic development value is not a ready measure for
conservation benefit.
Further, use of lost economic development value as the measure
of the deduction has driven up the costs of the program. In terms
of revenue loss, many of the taxpayers most likely to donate
conservation easements are unlikely to develop the property in any
event and would be willing to part with the easement for much less
than the current tax benefit. As argued by Professor Josh Eagle,
use of lost economic development value creates a significant
"subjective value spread," representing the difference between the
easement value and the subjective value to the taxpayer of the
donated property right.13 The spread, he argues, is manifest in
many, if not most, easement contributions, indicating significant
waste within the easement program.
Note, however, that although Professor Eagle's overall point is a
good one, the presence of a subjective value spread is not unique to
easement contributions, but exists with respect to other types of
property contributions. 40 Importantly, the subjective value spread
takes on greater significance in the context of conservation
easements because lost economic development value is not the
right measure for the deduction for donated easements, and,
therefore, problems associated with a subjective value spread may
137. See supra Part I.B.2.
138. Eagle, supra note 14, at 75-77.
139. Id.
140. For example, Professor Eagle illustrates his argument with a hypothetical charitable
contribution of a pair ofjeans, the subjective value of which, he posits, is less than the "fair
market value." Id. at 74-75. Of course, one could suggest here that the "fair market value"
Professor Eagle asserts for thejeans is an overvaluation-the more accurate value is the value
offered for purchase. This speaks to the problem of "fair market value" generally as the
measure for the deduction when property values are highly uncertain. Taxpayers can exploit
the uncertainty by plausibly maintaining that fair market value is much higher than the item
would actually sell for between a willing buyer and a willing seller.
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be addressed through choice of a different measure for the tax
benefit.'
In other words, the tax system normally tolerates the
windfalls (and inefficiencies) of a subjective value spread because
the tax incentive is based on the value of the benefit to charity.
Such value, in theory, is objectively equal to the value of the
contributed property, and does not depend on subjective value.
Furthermore, although the spread is of concern, administratively, it
would be next to impossible to base a deduction on the subjective
value of contributed property.
However, in the easement
context, where the value is not related to the conservation benefit,
the subjective value spread is not a necessary outgrowth of the
deduction. Accordingly, a better measure for the deduction may
have the beneficial effect of reducing windfalls.
As discussed in Part I, the use of lost economic development
value also carries significant administrative, policy, and reputational
costs.
On the administrative side, much of the enforcement
apparatus of the IRS with respect to the conservation easement
program is devoted to challenging a false measure for the
deduction. '4 As an agency given the task of raising revenue and
141. For the normal charitable contribution, there is really no choice of value problern,

because the fair market value works. That said, in cases in which the taxpayer's claimed
value and the benefit received by charity are vastly different, Congress has intervened to
change the measure of the deduction. For example, Congress addressed one version of this
problem in the vehicle donation context. Concerned that taxpayers were basing deductions
on fair market values printed in reference books, and that charities were receiving far less
than such amounts from sales of the vehicles, the measure for the donation was changed
from an appraised fair market value to sales proceeds. American Jobs Creation Act of 2004,
Pub. L. No. 108-357, § 884, 118 Stat. 1418, 1632-34 (codified as amended at I.R.C. §
170(f)(12) (2010)). So, although the measure for the deduction remained fair market
value, the actual price produced in a willing-buyer, willing-seller exchange (i.e., the benefit
to charity) was preferred to a hypothetical price. Another example involved contributions of
intellectual property, with respect to which Congress changed the measure of the deduction
to be based largely on the income attributable to the property actually received by the
donee. I.R.C. § 170(m) (2006). The author was involved in the drafting of both the vehicle
and the intellectual property legislation. See generally Halperin, suftra note 14, at 39-40
(discussing both examples).
142. Arguably, in some cases, the subjective value spread is just another way of describing
an overvaluation problem-i.e., the "subjective value" really is, or should be, equated with
the fair market value, but is not because of uncertainty. In some cases, of course, the
subjective value and the lost economic development value could be the same. Often,
however, they are not. See generally Eagle, supra note 14 (analyzing the subjective value
spread in the context of conservation easements).
143. As argued below, although reducing windfalls is always a good idea, it should not be
the main objective. Some windfalls (defined in terms of a subjective value spread) are
unavoidable and are even acceptable if the conservation value of the property is high.
144. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 76 ("Nearly all of the cases actually litigated by the
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closing the tax gap, 45 the IRS reasonably attacks the measure of the
deduction as the principal means of minimizing abuse. Therefore,
although it makes sense for valuation to be the focus of revenue
agents, the emphasis on proving or disproving lost economic
development value is unfortunate.
Further, with respect to policy, although IRS efforts to control
valuation abuse may function to protect tax revenues, such efforts
do not also serve the purpose of defining the conservation benefit.
In addition, the revenue-based focus on valuation means that
concomitant resources are not devoted to testing the conservation
purposes of easements or developing standards for conservation
benefits. Moreover, and most importantly, the focus on debating
a somewhat fictional and often uninformative number means that
what should be the most important aspect of a programpromoting conservation-is shortchanged. Whether or not an
easement is well designed to promote conservation is left
principally to the conservation purpose requirement, which, as
argued above, is largely unenforceable. 4 7
There may also be reputational fallout from basing the deduction
on lost economic development value. As shown in Part I, the many
abuses associated with the easement program may have damaged
the cause of conservation, the credibility of land trusts, and the
broader image of the charitable sector. The quest for the lost
economic development value is the source of many of these abuses.
It promises a lucrative tax benefit (magnified in many cases by
additional state tax benefits), perhaps with little "parting cost" by
taxpayers, and a reasonable chance of success on valuation if the
IRS with respect to conservation easements [from] 1987 [to 2004] have turned on the issue
of valuation."); see aLbo supra notes 51-54.
145. The tax "gap" is the difference between taxes owed and taxes paid and is the subject
of ongoing concern. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF 'riETREASURY, REDUCING THE FEDERAL TAX GAP:
A REPORT ON IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2007) (describing the tax gap problem
and proposing policies to improve compliance); U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, UPDATE ON
REDUCING TiHE FEDERAL. TAx GAP AND IMPROVING VOLUNTARY COMPLIANCE (2009) (updating
the aforementioned 2007 report).
146. The IRS has occasionally attempted to enforce the conservation purpose
requirement by asserting that a given easement has no value because there is no
conservation benefit. This "no value" argument has proven difficult to win because there is
always likely to be soime difference in the value of property after its use is restricted. See
McClure et al., supra note 42, at 554 (2009) (noting the court's "general rejection" of the
zero value argument).
147. See suftra Part I.B.3.
148. Eagle, supra note 14, at 47.
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issue is litigated.' 9 A more readily ascertainable measure for the
deduction would avoid many of the worst aspects of these
problems.
3. Conservation Value Should Be the Measure of the Tax Benefit
What should the measure of the tax benefit be? As suggested
above, the measure should be based on the public benefit or
benefit to charity secured by the contribution. That is, in theory, as
with other charitable contributions, a value should be placed on
the benefit conveyed to charity. In the case of conservation
easements, this benefit is the conservation value.
Using conservation value as the measure for the tax benefit
generally makes sense. It is, after all, the value of the good the tax
system is trying to encourage.150 The problem, however, is that
there does not appear to be a quantifiable conservation value upon
which a tax benefit could reliably be based. How does one reduce
endangered species protection to a number for tax purposes? Or
the scenic benefits of an open space easement? Or preservation of
a historically important land area?
As a general matter,
conservation value, unlike market value, is qualitative, not
quantitative.15 1
Indeed, it is precisely this problem of valuing conservation that
led to use of lost economic development value as the measure for
the deduction in the first place' 5"-as well as the resulting
confusion. So, although a theoretically preferable measure for the
tax benefit is the conservation value of the contribution, an exact
rendering of conservation value probably is even more prone to
uncertainty and manipulation than lost economic development
value.
The difficulty of quantifying conservation value also makes
reducing the conservation easement tax expenditure to a question
of efficiency somewhat incongruous.
Without a doubt,
policymakers seek confidence that an expenditure is efficient, on a
programmatic or a transactional basis. But when a program's
149. See supra notes 42-45.
150. Accord Halperin, supra note 14, at 41 (noting that "[t]he focus should be on actual
benefit to the public" and not in the diminution in value to the donor).
151. Efforts are being made to quantify conservation benefits. See supra Part I.B.4. As
discussed in Part III, such efforts should be encouraged through eligibility for a more
valuable tax benefit.
152. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 68-69.

38

COLUMBIAJOURNAL OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

[Vol. 37:1

benefits cannot reasonably be quantified and compared to a
program's costs, the answer should not be to abandon the
program.
Instead, steps should be taken to foster greater
confidence in the program's benefits.
4. Possible Alternative Measures: A Percentage of the Value of
the Entire Interest or Cost-Basis
If neither lost economic development value nor conservation
value is to be used as the measure, what other measures are
available? One candidate is a percentage of the value of the entire
property to which the easement relates. An immediate benefit of
basing the deduction on the value of the entire interest would be to
eliminate reliance on an unverifiable, largely fictional, and not very
informative number (i.e., lost economic development value) as the
measure of the tax benefit. Valuation would still be required, but
the valuation would be of the entire property interest, which is a
much more objective figure than the valuation of a conservation
easement. Once the value was determined, a set percentage of the
value could be calculated to arrive at the amount of the tax benefit.
Importantly, there would be no "after" valuation, no need to factor
in assumptions about the likelihood of development, and no use of
subdivision development analysis" or other questionable methods
of valuation.
Another benefit of using the value of the entire interest would be
that resources currently devoted to contesting easement values
could be spent on the conservation benefit side of the equation. As
noted in Part I, considerable administrative effort is currently spent
pinning down the lost economic development value. If similar
resources were directed toward ensuring conservation benefit,
there should be greater assurances than currently exist that the
public purposes of the program were being met.
In addition, taxpayers also would have greater certainty about the
amount of the available tax benefit in deciding whether to
contribute an easement. Further, eliminating reliance on lost
economic development value would also dramatically reduce one
main avenue of abuse of the easement program. With less gaming
possible through valuation, and more enforcement focus on
conservation benefits, there would be fewer opportunities for
abuse, thus decreasing the considerable reputational costs of the
153. See
suprra note 40.
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program.
An important objection to awarding the tax benefit based on a
percentage of the value of the entire interest, however, is that
without additional rules, there could be a new avenue for abuse. 5 4
Taxpayers could have an incentive to design easements with the
weakest possible conservation purposes, with a guarantee that no
matter how weak the easement, a deduction equal to a set
percentage of the property's overall value would be awarded. In
such cases, the IRS would be denied a weapon to debate the
easement through a valuation challenge. Admittedly, this risk is
real.'5 5 As discussed in greater detail in Part III, this risk must be
countered by strengthening the requirements of contributed
easements, and by providing for different percentages based on the
conservation value of the contribution, which in some cases should
be quite low.
The risk suggests that another alternative measure for the
deduction should be considered. Namely, the deduction could
equal a percentage of the donor's basis in the underlying property.
In general, the basis of property is its cost and represents the
amount that is not subject to tax when the property is sold for a
gain, or the amount that is used to determine any loss.'" Using a
percentage of basis as the deduction would allow donors to recover
a portion of their costs before ultimate disposition of the property,
and so would represent a tax benefit in the form of accelerated cost
recovery.
Using basis as the measure would not be unprecedented, as basis,
and not fair market value, already is the amount of the charitable
deduction for certain types of property. 1' Basis also would share
154. In the context of facade easements, donors for a time relied on informal IRS
training materials to claim easement values based not strictly on the before-and-after method
but rather on a range of values by which easements might be expected to reduce the value of
the property. The IRS disavowed such an approach. Seel.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 200738013
(Aug. 9, 2007), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-wd/0738013.pdf; see abo Colinvaux,
supra note 55, at 24-25 (discussing facade easement scandals).
155. One way to check the risk would be to use the before-and-after value as a cap so that
the deduction could not exceed the lesser of the set percentage of the entire interest value
or the before-and-after value. However, this would reintroduce lost economic development
value, and many of its pitfalls, back into the equation, and move away from what should be
the goal: developing an approach to conservation value. Nevertheless, if the deduction is
reformed, retaining lost economic development value as a cap to a deduction or credit as
described in Part III should still be weighed.
156. I.R.C. § 1001 (2006).
157. For example, basis is the deduction for short-term capital gain property, I.R.C. §
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the advantages discussed above with respect to using a percentage
of the value of the entire interest-greater focus on conservation
benefits and more taxpayer certainty as to the deduction amount.
Further, with a basis approach, valuation of the property would not
be necessary in many cases because basis is not a value concept.15
Donors, of course, would have to know and document the basis in
the property. But such recordkeeping is already required by
present law, as taxpayers must track a property's basis in order to
calculate gain or loss on disposition. 159
Importantly, under a basis approach, the tax benefit would be
capped at basis, which in cases of property long held, might itself
be relatively low, perhaps severely limiting the incentive. Further, a
basis approach clearly would run counter to the general fair market
value rule of present law for long-term capital gain, exempt-use
property. This highlights both a strength and a weakness of a basis
approach. The strength is that discarding the fair market value
measure for appreciated easement property might symbolize a
small step toward eliminating the fair market value deduction for
appreciated property generally. The weakness of using basis is that
if the goal of the tax benefit is to encourage contributions of highvalue conservation property, basis and cost recovery might prove to
be limited concepts. The purpose of the easement program is not,
or should not be, merely to allow donors to recover their costs.
Rather the goal is to encourage donors to make certain land use
decisions with respect to their property-and to reward them for
doing so.
Accordingly, the reward should be based, as much as possible, on
the merits of the land use decision, i.e., the benefit to charity. And
although neither the value of the entire interest nor the basis
measure bears a direct relation to the conservation value of the
property, on balance, the value of the entire interest appears to
provide greater flexibility for a tax benefit that, overall, is designed
170(e)(1)(A), certain contributions to private foundations, I.R.C. § 170(e)(B)(ii), and for
tangible personal property not intended for an exempt use, I.R.C. § 170(e) (B) (i).
158. Reliance on value would not be entirely eliminated, however, because if the property
was a loss property, under the present law structure, the deduction once again would be
based on fair market value. I.R.C. § 170(e) (providing for a reduction from fair market value
only in the case of gain property).
159. I.R.C. § 1001; see also Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h)(3)(iii) (as amended in 2009)
(requiring that conservation easement donors reduce the basis of the underlying property by
an amount allocable to the contributed easement; such amount, however, is based on the
before-and-after value).
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to generate easement contributions with a high conservation value.
C. The Amount of the Benefit and a Conservation Tax Credit
A critical issue in developing an alternative to lost economic
development value is establishing the percentage of the new
measure's value that would determine the amount of the tax
benefit. A percentage set too high might encourage frivolous
contributions, while one set too low might not be a sufficient
incentive. Perhaps the easiest approach would be to set the
percentage at a revenue-neutral rate, that is, the rate that would
generate the same amount of revenue loss as under current law. At
a minimum, this should allow for a reduction in administrative and
reputational costs.' 0 The percentage also could be set at a rate
thought to optimize responsiveness and minimize waste.
Consistent with the discussion above, however, the rate should be
set at a level that is tied to the conservation value of the
contribution. This might best be achieved through the use of
multiple percentages correlated to conservation value, i.e., the
stronger the conservation benefits, the larger the tax incentives. In
addition, the value of the tax benefit to the donor should depend
directly on such conservation benefits, not on the donor's marginal
tax rate. This means that the easement program should be
converted from a deduction to a credit,1 6 1 with the value of the
entire property serving as the measure for the credit.
The distinction between a deduction and a credit is an important
one. One of the often-maligned quirks of deduction-based benefits
is that they favor the more affluent (a so-called "upside-down"
subsidy) .' As an initial matter, this is because many deductions
(including the charitable deduction) are available only to taxpayers
160. This is not to suggest that coming tip with a revenue neutral rate would be easy or
that the conservation benefits would be the same. Facially, a revenue neutral rate merely says
that the same dollar value of tax benefits are being claimed with the new measure as with the
old. But it does not say anything about the comparative quality of easements. Success in
reducing administrative and reputational costs ultimately would depend on the effectiveness
of strengthening easement requirements.
161. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 47 (arguing that if the tax expenditure remains it
could be replaced by tax credits, capped annually, and jointly administered by the IRS and a
specialist agency such as the Bureau of Land Management).
162. See, e.g., CHARLES T. CLOTFELTER, FEDERAL TAX POLICY AND CHARIrABLE GIVING 285
(1985) (noting the widespread criticism of the upside-down effect in the charitable
contribution context); McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 29-35 (discussing the upside-down effect
in the easement contribution context).
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who itemize deductions," who are generally wealthier than
nonitemizers.'6 More fundamentally, a deduction's dollar value to
the taxpayer depends on the taxpayer's marginal tax rate, with
higher income itemizers receiving a more valuable tax benefit.1
In effect, for deductions, the percentages that define the value of
the tax benefit are derived independently from the activity that
generates the benefit. By contrast, as a general matter, credits do
not have an upside-down effect built-in. Credits can be targeted to
certain income levels, may be refundable (and even tradable), and
can be as generous or as stingy as necessary to produce the desired
behavior.'1" Thus, in general, if the purpose of a tax benefit is to
subsidize an activity, a credit provides more flexibility than a
deduction.
Moreover, as a general matter, deductions, with their upsidedown aspect, make sense when the reason for the deduction is to
accurately measure income, i.e., when the goal is to remove certain
expenses from the tax base (similar to an exclusion) .1 But, in the
case of conservation easements, there is little reason to think that
income measurement concerns are acute. Indeed, it is fairly clear
that the easement deduction was intended as a subsidy. Although
the conservation easement charitable contribution has had an
awkward legislative history, the evidence indicates that Congress
intended in 1976 and 1980 to encourage landowners to part with
easements in order to subsidize conservation.'" In other words, the
purpose of the legislation was not just to remove the burden of
taxation on landowners with respect to easement contributions.
Further, there is something in the nature of a partial interest
easement contribution that suggests a nondeductible expense of a
personal nature.'"9 By definition, the taxpayer does not relinquish
the entire property and often retains substantial rights and the
163. I.R.C. § 63(d).
Returns of Ienizers by AGI 1999-2000, TAx POL'Y CENTER, http://
164. Tax Facts:
www.taxpolicyceter.org/taxfacts/displayafact.cfm?Docid=386 (last visited Nov. 11, 2011)
(showing taxpayers who itemize deductions by income level); see also CLOTFELTER, supra note

162, at 285-86.
165. See CLOTFELTER, supra note 162, at 285-86.
166. For a discussion of tax credits and deductions and the relevant considerations
informing use of one or the other, see generally Brian H. Genn, The Casefor Tax Credits, 61
TAX LAWYER 549 (2008).

167. SeeAndrews, supra note 129, at 313.
168. Seesupra Part H.A.
169. See I.RC. § 262 (2006) (disallowing deductions for personal expenses).
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continued ability to use (and in some cases develop) it."e The
taxpayer is also likely to be in personal agreement with and enjoy
the post-contribution use of the property."' To the extent the
taxpayer has suffered a loss of income with respect to the
contribution, the loss would occur upon sale and not at the time of
the contribution.12
Accordingly, as an adjustment to measure
income, a conservation easement deduction does not seem
warranted.
As an additional distraction, the valuation of a partial interest
within the charitable deduction framework has led to an
overemphasis on private benefit issues,' again to the detriment of
a focus on conservation benefits.
This is because under the
charitable contribution rules, the lost economic development value
must be reduced by the value of any private benefit to the donor. 7 4
Although this rule is easy to state, it is difficult to apply in the
partial-interest easement context. The principal issue is whether a
donor's continued use and enjoyment of the property should offset
the lost economic development value, i.e., to what extent is the very

170. This is the nature of a partial interest contribution. See Turner v. Comm'r, 126 T.C.
299 (2006); Glass v. Comm'r, 124 T.C. 258, affd, 471 F.3d 698 (6th Cir. 2006);JoINTr COMM.
ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 284.
171. See Eagle, supra note 14, at 79.
172. This would be an argument for allowing charitable deductions for contributions of
partial interests, but not until the "loss" of the partial interest becomes realized upon a sale
of the underlying fee. See Sarah B. Lawsky, The Sum of its Patsi: Reforming CharitableDonations

of Partial Interests, 64 TAX L. REV. 37, 56-61 (2010) (arguing that as a general matter, a
deduction for partial interests should be allowed but that the deduction should be limited to
the donor's basis in the property).
173. See, e.g., JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14, at 285 (noting the valuation
difficulties when the donor continues the personal use of the retained property).
174. This is just a straightforward application of the general rule that the charitable
deduction be reduced by the amount of any return benefit received (quid pro quo), or
denied outright if any private benefit resulting from the contribution exceeds the public
benefit from the contribution (substantial return benefit). See Ottawa Silica Co. v. United
States, 699 F.2d 1124, 1131-32 (Fed. Cir. 1983); Rev. Proc. 92-49, 1992-26 I.R.B. 18; Rev. Rul.
67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104. Accordingly, the easement regulations require various reductions in
the deduction to account for private benefit. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(h) (3) (as amended in
2009) (providing that if "the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to
receive, financial or economic benefits that are greater than those that will inure to the
general public form the transfer, no deduction is allowable under this section. However, if
the donor or a related person receives, or can reasonably expect to receive, a financial or
economic benefit that is substantial, but it is clearly shown that the benefit is less than the
amount of the transfer, then a deduction under this section is allowable for the excess of the
amount transferred over the amount of the financial or economic benefit received or
reasonably expected to be received. . . .").
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fact of retaining an interest a private benefit?'7 5 Although the
retained interest has no direct bearing on the lost economic
development value (which is supposed to be determined objectively
based on the easement terms), the fact that the taxpayer continues
to benefit from the property seems relevant to whether, or the
extent to which, a donor should get a charitable deduction for the
partial interest contribution. Arguably, however, in the context of
a tax benefit designed to secure conservation goals, private benefit
to the taxpayer is, or should be, of less importance than meeting
the goal.""
Further, as a policy matter, there is no obvious justification for
providing wealthier taxpayers with a greater tax benefit than
others-which is the natural result of using a deduction.' 7 Indeed,
some have argued that affluent taxpayers with an interest in
-conservation are likely to be less responsive to the tax benefit in
deciding whether to make a contribution because the motivation
for such taxpayers when making a contribution is not monetary.
This issue has also arisen in the context of "cash poor-land rich"
taxpayers, or those with large-value deductions but not enough
income to benefit from the deduction.'7 9 The charitable deduction
rules have been changed (temporarily) to accommodate such
taxpayers. 1o
175. One illustration of private benefit concerns is when the donor has a residence on
the property that becomes subject to the contributed easement. The donor continues to live
on and enjoy the property, calling into question either the nature of the public benefit or
the amount of private benefit to the donor. Situations such as this have led to calls for
elimination or reduction of the tax benefit in cases where donors continue to maintain a
residence on the property after the contribution. JolNTr COMM. ON TAXATION, supra note 14,
at 285.
176. Although positing that private benefit should be of only marginal concern in the
easement context may seem anathema, any such reaction is partly because thinking about
the conservation easements has been boxed in by the charitable deduction. Most tax
benefits entail a significant private benefit to the taxpayer; indeed, often that is the whole
point: the tax system provides a private benefit (the tax benefit) in exchange for activity
thought to be socially desirable (e.g., installing energy efficient windows).
177. A deduction might be more appropriate when higher-bracket taxpayers require a
larger incentive than others to undertake the desired activity.
178. See Eagle, supra note 14, at 89; McLaughlin, supranote 2, at 100.
179. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 99.
180. Initially, easement contributions were subject to the generally applicable percentage
limitation rules (which limit the charitable deduction as a percentage of the donor's
adjusted gross income) and the canyover rules (which allow charitable contributions not
deducted in one year by reason of the percentage limitations to be deducted over the five
subsequent years). I.R.C. § 170(b) (2006). Land trust organizations and others argued that
the percentage limitations and carryovers should be increased for easement contributions,
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A credit, therefore, not only would provide tax benefits more
equitably, but also would avoid some of the other pitfalls that have
resulted from the decision to style the easement program as a
charitable deduction. Nevertheless, some might object that a
credit, like the present system, might not adequately address the
problem of waste (i.e., paying more than necessary to secure the
contribution). Although the level of waste depends on the credit
percentage, the question ultimately should be whether waste,
though unfortunate, is a reasonable cost of the program. The
reasonableness of the waste will depend on whether the program is
designed to maximize conservation benefits while providing a
reasonable degree of confidence that such benefits significantly
exceed any waste.
Another objection to the use of a credit might be based on
transactional efficiency. Transactional efficiency concerns might
arise if the value of the tax benefit as proposed exceeded, in any
case, the lost economic development value. Then, some might
argue, the government would be paying more for the easement
than it was worth.'8
For example, if the lost economic
development value of the easement is $100,000 and the tax benefit
is $150,000, then, arguably, the transaction is inefficient to the tune
of at least $50,000 because the government would have paid more
for the property than it was worth.
Although the optics of this transaction are troubling, the issue
presented highlights again the problem of value at the heart of the
easement contribution. The key question is whether the benefit to
charity is the same as the lost economic development value. In the
usual case, the presence of a market establishes a value that can
reliably be used as a proxy for the benefit given to charity, whether
cash or in-kind. But without a market, the value given to easements
does not really answer the question of the benefit to charity-i.e.,
the conservation value. Thus, if the conservation value of the
and succeeded in convincing Congress to pass temporary legislation to this effect. Pension
Protection Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-280, § 1219(c) (1), 120 Stat. 780, 1084-85 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 170(f)(11) (E) (2009)). If the easement program were made a credit,
the debate about percentage limitations and carryovers arguably would be more transparent
and would shift to a debate about the credit percentage, refundability, and tradability of the
credits.
181. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 98-99 (arguing that "paying more for
easements than a very modest premium over their market cost would be bad public policy"
where market cost is calculated using the before-and-after method of easement valuation,
and is an example of "transactional inefficiency").
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property were reliably calculated to be $20,000,000, then clearly it
would be worth it to spend $150,000 to secure such value. Even if
the donor ends up with an amount that is greater than the lost
economic development value, the public, as a whole, still comes out
ahead.
In short, although there clearly are concerns in this example
about waste (i.e., the donor's price may be based on lost economic
development value, not conservation value), an argument based on
transactional efficiency, as such, should account for the fact that
the merits of the transaction should be measured by reference to
conservation value, not lost economic development value. If the
conservation value is the measure for the tax benefit, and the
benefit is a percentage (less than 100%) of such value, then
transactional efficiency concerns are lessened even if the benefit
exceeds the lost economic development value of the easement.
Of course, changing the measure of the tax benefit from lost
economic development value to a percentage of the value of the
entire property interest and shifting from a deduction to a credit
would place significant pressure on the concept of conservation
value" and on the necessary rules to provide better assurances
than currently exist that the conservation benefits of the program
are significant and exceed the costs. Part III takes up the issue of
reforming the conservation easement tax expenditure with an eye
toward developing a stronger concept of conservation value.

182. In moving from a deduction to a credit, there are also concerns regarding fairness.
For example, assume that the charitable contribution deduction is converted into a twenty
percent credit and that there are two taxpayers both with $500,000 of income and that the
highest marginal rate is thirty-five percent. One taxpayer makes a charitable contribution of
$10,000 and the other makes no charitable contribution. One objection to the credit is that
the taxpayer making the contribution will have to pay a tax with respect to a portion of the
contributed funds (in this case, the credit is worth $2,000, but does not fully offset the $3,500
tax liability owed with respect to the $10,000 of income). It could be argued that this result
is unfair, and might be a serious disincentive to making charitable contributions. Another
objection could be based on a comparison of the two taxpayers. Both must pay tax on the
same base of income, $500,000, even though one taxpayer has given a substantial amount to
charity. If the charitable contribution is not viewed as consumption, then this arguably is
unfair because the contributing taxpayer has less ability to pay than the noncontributing
taxpayer.
Interestingly, the deduction for charitable contributions already makes
considerably less sense than a credit tinder a subsidy rationale for the tax benefit. This is
because under a subsidy theory, the purpose of the tax benefit is to encourage certain
behavior, and it follows that the value of the tax benefit should be set at a level that will
optimally induce the desired behavior.
See Mark P. Gergen, The Case for a Chaneiable
ContributionsDeduction, 74 VA. L. REv. 1393, 1396 (1988).

2012]

The Conservation Easement Tax Expenditure

47

III. REFORMING THE CONSERVATION EASEMENT TAx EXPENDITURE
Parts I and II of this Article suggest that the conservation
easement tax expenditure is problematic and misunderstood. As
argued in Part I, it is difficult to conclude with conviction that the
benefits of the program outweigh the considerable costs without
having a measure of conservation benefits that can fairly be
compared to program costs. Further, as argued in Part II, the
conservation easement tax expenditure is not well designed to
provide assurances that the program is delivering conservation
benefits. This partly is due to the historical accident of making the
conservation easement program a charitable deduction. This led
to the adoption of an erroneous measure for the tax benefit-lost
economic development value-a value that has managed to define
thinking about the program both administratively and from a
conservation benefits point of view. Part II also argues that a more
appropriate measure for the tax benefit would be based on
conservation value, and that a credit is preferable to a deduction.
Part III of the Article now explores some of the issues entailed in
reforming the conservation easement tax expenditure with a
central goal: that the program be changed in a manner that will
produce a stronger conception of conservation value such that
policymakers, land trusts, and the general public can be more
confident about the benefits of the program and that the program
is worth the costs.
A. Replace the Tax Expenditure with a Direct Spending Program?
One possible reform would be to replace the tax expenditure
with a direct spending program.
In general, the principal reason
for a spending program is the discipline such a program would
provide. The appropriations process would serve as a constant
check on supply and provide a cap on available funds. With scarce
resources to acquire easements, better and more deliberate
decisions would be made about which easements to acquire, and
the conservation benefits from the acquisitions would be better
articulated.14 In addition, a purchase transaction would introduce

183. See, e.g., REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 23; Eagle, supra note 14, at 86.
184. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 45-47 (advocating for a direct spending program
because "[t]he amount spent is known and relevant, projects can be prioritized based on
merit, and the program can be targeted to accomplish specific conservation goals.").
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some market discipline to the price paid, better ensuring
transactional efficiency and minimizing waste.
Although these points in favor of direct spending on
conservation serve as useful critiques of the tax expenditure, to a
certain extent, they are misdirected. Direct spending programs on
conservation land (and easements) already exist."'' So the choice is
not necessarily either/or, but rather how best to allocate resources
between the two policy tools, or whether there is value to the tax
expenditure approach.
This Article argues that a conservation easement tax benefit
Although imperfect, privately-initiated,
should be retained.
government-supported conservation has many benefits. As a
general matter, the tax expenditure likely results in lower costs per
acre covered and lower transaction costs per transaction than a
direct spending program, fosters voluntary action, and promotes
the value of conservation by encouraging the growth of land trusts
and other private actors who develop expertise in, and act as
Thus, the focus should not
guardians of, conservation property.
be on an abolition of the tax expenditure, but rather on its
improvement. However, advocates for the conservation easement
tax benefit also should recognize the limitations of the program. It
is, and should be, merely part of an overall conservation strategy, 87
and not an invitation to broaden conservation beyond the confines
of public concern.'
185. See, e.g., U.S. DEPT OF AGRIc. FOREST SERV., FOREST LEGACY PROGRAM
IMPLEMENTATION GUIDELINES (2003), available at http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/library/
flp-guidelines.pdf; see also Forest Legacy Program, U.S. DEP'T OF AGRIc. FOREST SERV.,
http://www.fs.fed.us/spf/coop/programs/loa/aboutflp.shtml (last updated Feb. 6, 2008)
(describing the Forest Legacy Program with respect to which the U.S. acquires conservation
easements through purchase);

Farm and Ranch Lands Irotection 1rograma, NATURAL RES.

CONSERVATION SERV., U.S. DEP'T oiF AGRIC., http://www.nrcs.tisda.gov/wps/portal/nrcs/
main/national/programs/easements/farmranch (last updated Dec. 16, 2011) (describing
the Farm and Ranch Land Protection Program, which "provides matching funds to keep
productive farm and ranchland in agricultural uses.").
186. See, e.g., Nancy A. McLaughlin, The Role of Land Trusts in Biodiversity Conseration on

Private Lands, 38 IDAHO L. REV. 453, 471 (2002) ("Although conservation easements are not
useful in every situation and should not be viewed as a substitute for governmental
regulation or acquisition of critical lands, they can be effective in protecting land where
retained private ownership and limited use is consistent with biodiversity conservation
goals."); Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a Greater Private Role, 21 VA.
ENvrL. L.J. 245, 309-10 (2002) (describing the important role in conservation played by
private organizations such as land trusts).
187. See Owley, supra note 2, at 150-51.
188. See McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 109 (noting that before any new incentives are
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B. Elements of a Tax Credit
As argued in Part II, the current deduction could be replaced by
a tax credit, with multiple percentages based on the value of the
entire interest contributed. The overriding purpose of a credit
would be to tie the tax benefit to the conservation value. The exact
percentages would depend on a variety of factors, but the general
framework should be low default percentage(s), with higher
percentages available upon satisfaction of additional conservation
benefit criteria.
1. Conservation Purposes
Present law treats conservation purposes as monolithic,
considering preservation for recreation, scenic benefits and open
space, historically important land areas, and ecosystem protection
as ftngible.m
In fact, each type of easement is directed to a
different conservation value-habitat protection, open space,
public recreation, and historic preservation-and there is no
reason that the tax credit percentages must be the same for each
purpose. Conservation that addresses ecosystem protection, for
example, arguably should take priority over other conservation
values, a priority that could be reflected in higher credit
percentages.SOo

2. Exclusions
Congress should provide that in some cases, the conservation
value of a conservation easement is zero (with the result that the
credit is not available). One candidate for this treatment would be
easements that protect property in a manner substantially similar to
protections already established by local or state law. For instance,
many facade easements on properties in historic districts should
not be credit-eligible. For purposes of this exclusion, it would
make no difference if a donor could show that the easement
diminished the value of the retained property, or that the easement
is perpetual (as compared to the vagaries of state or local law). In
adopted, efficiency must be considered).
189. I.R.C. § 170(h) (4) (2006).
190. See, e.g., Julia LeMense Huff, Protecting Ecosystems Using Conservation Tax Incentives:
How Much Bang Do We Get for Our Buck?, 11 Mo. ENvL. L. & PoL'Y REv. 138, 153-58 (2004)
(considering how tax incentives can best be used to promote ecosystem protection, as
distinct from promoting other conservation goals).
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other words, it should be presumed that if public law restrictions
are in place, private law restrictions, as a general matter, do not add
significant new conservation value for credit purposes. Another
candidate might be conservation easements on golf courses.'
3. Eligibility for, and Levels of, the Default Percentage(s)
As a general matter, present requirements for easement eligibility
should be retained; however, a threshold conservation benefit
In order for any
eligibility standard should be introduced.
easement to be credit-eligible, the easement must: (1) yield a
significant public benefit, (2) be pursuant to a clearly delineated
federal, state, or local governmental conservation policy, and (3)
substantially restrict the development of the majority of the entire
interest.
The significant public benefit test already exists as a requirement
for open space easements, so this would be merely an extension
of that test to all types of conservation easements. The clearly
delineated government policy requirement is currently imposed for
non-scenic open space easements,' so this too would be an
extension of a present law rule to cover all conservation easement
contributions. The effect would be to require (at a minimum) that
every private conservation easement be related to a public policy
apart from the Code's current conservation purpose declaration. 195
The substantial restriction requirement would be new, and
191. For example, in South Carolina, the conservation easement credit is not available
with respect to golf courses. S.C. CODE ANN. § 12-6-3515(B) (1) (c) (2010).
192. What constitutes a "majority" of the entire interest would depend on the type of
easement and the property affected.
193. I.R.C. § 170(h) (4) (A) (iii).
194. I.R.C. § 170 (h) (4) (A) (iii) (II).
195. There undoubtedly would be disagreement with respect to what constitutes a clearly
delineated government policy, but experience with the standard should clarify the
requirement over time. The requirement falls well short of mandating prior approval of an
easement for tax benefit purposes, which likely would be too restrictive and cumbersome for
government and private parties alike. See McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 15, at 1594 n.3
("Government certification of tax-deductible conservation easements would constitute a
fundamental change in existing policy, and one that carries with it significant risks and costs.
Accordingly, such a change should be seriously considered only if (i) the alleged problems
with the current system are conclusively established and (ii) there is good evidence that
government certification programs are feasible, would produce higher quality easements,
and would produce benefits that outweigh their costs."). The requirement would be subject
to legislative machinations, as developers or others might be able to sway a legislature to
approve a specific easement. But arguably, if a donor is able to persuade an elected body to
act, the outcome is no less public because of it.
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important. Its purpose would be to ensure that no frivolous
easements qualify for the credit and that only significant partial
interests are eligible. Taxpayers seeking to get "something for
nothing" would be dissuaded, because a gift of a property interest
affecting a majority of the retained interest would represent a
meaningful partial interest, and would not be given lightly.
Once the eligibility for default percentages is established, the
level of the default percentages initially should be set quite low.
One reason for this is to make the federal tax incentive less
attractive. As noted earlier, it is likely that there already is
considerable built-in waste in the easement program and many
easement donors likely are motivated to give for non-tax reasons.'9
In addition, as a new credit, it makes sense to start with low
percentages to test the responsiveness rate. Credit levels can be
increased subsequently if the take-up rate is viewed as too low.' 9 '
Perhaps most importantly, however, one reason that the
percentages should be low is to realign the federal tax incentive
relative to state law incentives. This would reflect a view that the
role of the federal tax incentive is not, and has not been, to
implement a federal conservation policy as such. Rather, the role
of the federal tax incentive has been to foster private conservation
efforts that occur on a more local level.'9 8 The larger the tax
incentive becomes (e.g., through high credit percentages), the
stronger the argument for more and sustained direct involvement
by federal authorities in easement selection, modification, and
termination.
Such sustained involvement, however, absent a more coherent
federal conservation tax policy, generally is better exercised at the
state or local level, as is seen in some states with tax credit
programs.'"9

Further, a less attractive federal incentive may also

have the beneficial impact of encouraging more states to take the
initiative and become involved in setting and enforcing local
196. See supra notes 137-144 and accompanying text.
197. In addition, as a practical political matter, it is easier to increase the benefit later
than to decrease it.
198. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 1, at 152 (noting that conservation easements are acquired
from the bottom tip and so "may provide communities with an alternative opportunity to
demonstrate their commitment to conservation values or to particular land use patterns, in
contrast to the top-down imposition of zoning restrictions or development changes");
Korngold, supranote 14, at 1055.
199. SeePifolr, supra note 14, at 10-11 (discussing different state programs, including the
program in Massachusetts, which requires prior state approval of conservation easements).
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conservation standards. Indeed, one of the difficulties of an
attractive, but open-ended, federal program is that more focused
state and local standards may not develop as extensively as they
otherwise would.
4. Enforcement, Perpetuity, and Eligible Donee Organizations
One constant concern in the easement program has been
effective enforcement by the easement holder (the donee
organization).200 At its core, the easement program is a private
* * 201
conservation program, with minimal government supervision.
Congress sets broad parameters through the conservation purpose
requirement, which allows a fairly pluralistic and permissive notion
of conservation. But, as noted above, once the contribution is
made, there is little to no continuing government involvement. If
easements are adversely modified (by amendment or disregard),
lapse through failure to record, terminate by agreement, or simply
are not enforced, the federal government has little recourse. 202
Because donation of an easement to charity likely creates a
charitable trust, the state attorney general may have authority to
intervene and enforce an easement.
In addition, many states
have rules about the creation, modification, and termination of
conservation easements.204 But on the whole, as noted above, a
200. See Korngold, supfra note 14, at 1059-60; McLaughlin, supra note 2, at 64-65.
201. See, e.g., McLaughlin, suprfa note 2, at 106 (stating that "[t]he current federal tax
incentive program is a largely automatic, low-oversight program ... ).
202. Such lack of recourse led to a proposal by the Bush administration to impose a
penalty in the case of easement modifications. For a discussion of the proposal, see STAFF OF
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 109TI l CONG., DESCRIPTION OF REVENUE PROVISIONS CONTAINED
IN THE PRESIDENr's FIScAL YEAR 2006 BUDGET PROPOSAL 239-41 (Comm. Print 2005).
203. The issue of whether an easement contribution creates a charitable trust has
generated considerable debate in the scholarly literature. Four law review articles have
debated the issue, with the central point turning on whether the provision in the Uniform
Conservation Easement Act (UCEA) that states that conservation easements may be modified
or terminated "in the same manner as other easements" has the effect of permitting
modification or termination by agreement of the parties notwithstanding the perpetuity
requirement of the easement (and the tax law). See Lindstrom, supra note 114, at 404-06;
McLaughlin & Weeks, supra note 114, at 81-85; Nancy A. McLaughlin & W. William Weeks,
In Defense of Consemation Easements: A Response to The End of Ierpetuity, 9 WYo. L. REv. 1, 33-36
(2009); C. Timothy Lindstrom, Hicks v. Dowd: The End of Ierpetuity?, 8 WYo. L. REv. 25, 35
(2008). Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss the debate in any detail,
Professor McLaughlin's arguments that the UCEA should not be interpreted as allowing the
dissolution of conservation easements by agreement in light of commentary on the UCEA,
federal tax law, the Restatement of Trusts, the Restatement of Servitudes, the Restatement
(Third) of Property, and the Uniform Trust Code are persuasive.
204. PIiOT, supra note 14, at 22-23.
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reason for the conservation easement is to leverage the private
property system for public land use purposes.205
Accordingly,
enforcement is largely a private matter, with outcomes resting on
the actions of the easement holder.
Private enforcement of a public trust is an issue that has divided
commentators. Do conservation easements represent the elevation
of one value above others, a value captured by private groups with
20
little-to-no accountability to the public at large?o
Or are the land
trusts surrogates for government, accountable to their donors and
to the public through application of conventional common law
charitable trust rules? 2 0
This debate is manifested through arguments about the federal
tax law requirement that easements must be perpetual to qualify
for the deduction. An argument in favor of perpetuity as a
condition of the tax benefit is that a perpetual restriction in many
cases best provides meaningful long-term conservation.20 s On the
other hand, an argument against perpetuity is that a conservation
land use decision made today generally is ad hoc, piecemeal, and
209
occurs with imperfect information.
Perpetual easements lock in
the present land use, making the use hard to alter amid changing
circumstances, including the evolving preferences of subsequent
owners and surrounding communities.
Under this view, an
essentially private transaction between a property owner and a
private
organization
becomes
an
immutable
decision,
unaccountable to democratic oversight, 2 0 and also fragments
ownership. A counter-argument is that existing charitable trust
doctrines and the exercise of the eminent domain power are
effective and important checks on permanence and dead-hand

205. Korngold, supra note 14, at 1055.
206. See, e.g., Korngold, supra note 14, at 1042-43; Mahoney, supra note 13, at 744
(concluding that conservation easements "may further the interests of members of the
present generation at the expense of future generations"); Owley, supra note 2, at 143, 14651.
207. See, e.g.,

Nancy A.

McLaughlin,

Rethinking the Perpetual Nature of Conservation

Easements, 29 HARV. ENVrt. L. Rrv. 421, 519-20 (2005).
208. See, e.g., McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 15, at 1594.
209. See Korngold, supra note 14, at 1063-64; Mahoney, supra note 13, at 744-45, 757-58
(arguing that the present generation is not omniscient about the future because of imperfect
information); Owley, supranote 2, at 152, 170 (noting the "haphazard, piecemeal nature" of
conservation easements).
210. See, e.g., Bray, supra note 1, at 137-38 (providing an overview of the debate);
Korngold, supra note 14, at 1043, 1059, 1064-65.
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control."'

Both sides of the debate have valid concerns. In the context of a
new conservation credit, however, perpetuity is the better rule. In
part, this is because conservation is, to a certain extent,
undervalued by the private property system.2 " Although perpetuity
offends some core property law principles, ' perpetual easements
are like affirmative action for conservation; normal rules are
switched off to redress a perceived land use imbalance in favor of
development. And though a term easement would not sound the
death knell for conservation efforts,1 there are valid concerns that
an original donor might have a change of heart and not renew,
new fee owners might not share the conservation goals of the
easement and opt out, and perhaps most importantly, land trusts
might not invest the same level of commitment to a temporary
interest as they would to a permanent interest.
Regardless, the choice between perpetual and term easements is,
to a certain extent, a false one. There is of course no guarantee of
perpetuity, nor should there be. In fact, perpetuity is a fiction-an
important fiction that guides behavior, but a fiction nonetheless.215
211. See generally McLaughlin & Machlis, supra note 15, at 1579-82.
Collins, Alienation of Conservation Easenents, 73 DENv. U. L. REV.

But see Richard B.

1103, 1103-04 (1996)

(noting that courts have created various ways to avoid dead-hand property restrictions).
212. See generally PAUL GOLDSTEIN & BARTON H. TiiomP'5N, JR., PROPERlY LAw:
OWNERSHIP, USE & CONSERVATION 228-31 (2006) (discussing the limitations of the private
property system for protecting endangered species and habitat).
213. See, e.g., JOHN C. GRAY, TIE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITIES § 201 (4th ed. 1942).
Concerns about "dead hand" control of land use decisions led to the rule against
perpetuities and the rule against restraints on alienation. See RESTATEMENT (TiiIRD) OF
PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.3 cmt. b (2000).
214. See Owley, supra note 2 (arguing for renewable term conservation easements); Bray,
supfra note 1, at 144 (noting that if the tax law allowed a deduction for term conservation
easements "it is possible-though by no means certain-that land trusts would be able to
acquire and protect land at rates similar to the present.").
215. See PIDOT, supra note 14, at 23 (noting that even if state attorneys general are
empowered to enforce the perpetuity requirement by virtue of charitable trust law, "many
state conservation easement laws fail to address this issue or do so ambiguously . . .. For the
attorney general to become involved there must be a system for publicly tracking
conservation easements .... [and] even if a conservation easement is abandoned, the
attorney general may decide that enforcing an easement is not a priority if the public had no
involvement in its creation."); Bray, supra note 1, at 138 (referring to easements as "facially
permanent"); James L. Olmsted, Capituing the Value of Appreciated Development Rights on
Consewation Easement Termination,30 ENVIRONS ENVTL. L. & PoL'YJ. 39, 46-47 (2006) (noting

that "[w]e cannot be sure that every, if any, 'perpetual' conservation easement will last for
perpetuity. Quite to the contrary, we can be sure that every conservation easement ever
drafted will eventually terminate or require amendment."); see also Owley, supra note 2, at
155-61 (discussing whether conservation easements are too easily changed).
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Although many factors are involved, at bottom, the perpetuity of an
easement depends upon the easement holder's willingness to
enforce its property right. To the extent the affected parties
mutually agree (formally or informally) to a changed land use,
absent a costly intervention by the state, the perpetual easement
may be altered as a practical matter.
The above arguments point to the importance of the integrity
and solvency of the easement holder. Currently, not much is
required of an eligible (nongovernment) donee.
Like others
qualified under section 501(c) (3) of the Code, qualified donees
must meet standard requirements, 217 including filing annual
information returns.2 1 8 They must also meet the commitment and
resources test of the regulations-namely, the organization must
"have a commitment to protect the conservation purposes of the
donation, and have the resources to enforce the restrictions."
However, the commitment test may be satisfied by including
appropriate
language
in
the
organization's
articles
of
incorporation,2 20 leading one commentator to conclude that it "can
be a mirage."2 2 ' The resources test is generic; no set aside of funds
is required.
More could be done to monitor the effectiveness and viability of
conservation organizations. Although private efforts to buttress
land trusts have made significant strides in recent years, 223 some

216. Further, although credit-eligible easements should be perpetual, modifications to
easements should not be viewed with inherent suspicion. As commentators have noted,
easements may be drafted to allow for amendments that facilitate conservation. Susan N.
Gary, The Problems of Donor Intent: Interpretation, Enforcement, and Doing the Right Thing, 85

CHI.-KENT L. REv. 977, 1037-38 (2010) (describing amendment provisions and the Land
Trust Alliance's recommendation of their inclusion in conservation easement agreements);
Nancy A. McLaughlin & Benjamin Machlis, Amending and Terminating Perpetual Conservation
Easements, PROB. & PROP.,July-Aug. 2009, at 52, 56 (noting that "land trusts should negotiate

for the inclusion of a standard amendment provision.").
217. I.R.C. § 501(c) (3) (2006) (setting forth rules requiring tax exempt organizations to
meet specific purposes and prohibiting the inurement of private shareholders, substantial
lobbying, and political activity).
218. I.R.C. § 6033.
219. Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-14(c)(1) (as amended in 2009).
220. Id.
221. SeeHalperin, supra note 14, at 36.
222. Id.
223. See, e.g., LAND TRUST ALLIANCE, supra note 63, at 14-15 (noting that 135 land trusts

had earned accreditation as of September 2011, but also that fifty percent of land is currently
protected by non-accredited land trusts, and thirty-eight percent of land is protected by The
Nature Conservancy, a current applicant); see also supranote 106.
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legal change regarding donee eligibility is also warranted. A rule
could, and should, be adopted that suspends a land trust's ability to
accept new credit-eligible donations if an audit of the organization
reveals repeated failures to enforce easements or an unsustainable
ratio of easements held to available resources. Tax exemption of
the organization and general eligibility to receive charitable
contributions need not be affected."' Rather, the goal would be to
prevent organizations with a poor management track record or
225
inadequate resources from acquiring new easements.
5. Higher Credit Percentages Based on Satisfaction of Additional
Conservation Criteria
The reason for providing a tax benefit for conservation
easements is to encourage the contribution of property with a high
conservation value. The principal problem with the tax benefit,
however, is the difficulty in quantifying conservation value.
Admittedly, basing the measure for the benefit on the value of the
entire interest does not bear a direct relationship to conservation
value. Rather, this measure makes sense not only as a matter of
administrative convenience and taxpayer certainty, but also because
it would remove the current confusing and erroneous measure and
largely eliminate the ability to manipulate the amount of the tax
benefit through a taxpayer-favorable valuation process. 226 With a
more appropriate measure in place, there would be room for
greater focus on the conservation value of the contributed
properties.
224. In other words, if an organization ceases to be a credit-eligible donee, this need
affect only future easement contributions and not ongoing exempt status under section
501(c)(3) of the Code, or the ability to make deductible charitable contributions to the
organization as a general matter. In 2005, the Senate Finance Committee staff proposed
revocation of tax-exempt status as a penalty for regular and continuous enforcement failures.
STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FIN., 109TH CONG., REFP. OF STAFF INVESTIGATION OF THE NATURE
CONSERVANCY, at Executive Summary 10 (2005). However, revocation of tax-exempt status is

a difficult sanction to impose. See Colinvaux, supra note 55, at 66 (arguing that often
revocation may be an unreasonable sanction). Another Finance Committee staff proposal
would impose excise taxes on officers and directors of the conservancy organization for
enforcement failures. Id. at 10; see aLbo Halperin, supranote 14, at 37 (noting that the excise
tax proposal "would put real teeth in the enforcement obligation").
225. Professor Halperin suggests limiting donee eligibility to "organizations that hold a
substantial number of easement grants and have sufficient staff to monitor and enforce
compliance." Halperin, supranote 14, at 37.
226. As noted supraPart II, a measure based on a percentage of the taxpayer's basis in the
property would also have these benefits.
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In addition, setting the default percentages at a low rate should
help minimize waste and abuse,2
while still providing a
conservation incentive. However, if all the available percentages
are set too low, some valuable conservation property might not be
contributed. The issue then becomes how to provide a greater
incentive for the higher value conservation property. One way
would be to increase the default percentages upon satisfaction of
additional conservation criteria.
At one extreme, higher credit percentages would be available for
properties that have been pre-approved by a designated highranking federal government official.2 2 8 This undoubtedly would
create a process similar to an appropriations process, whereby
donors and land trusts would lobby on behalf of particular
properties and easement terms. The transaction costs for each
donation would increase, and politics (not conservation) surely
would mar the process.
The benefits, however, would be greater government investment
in the substantive conservation policy of the program, and
development over time of conservation standards for properties
likely to obtain a higher credit percentage.2
Overt political
favoritism might also be checked by the involvement of the land
trust in the process, and, to a certain extent, through oversight by
watchdog organizations.
Additionally, the availability of a
potentially generous credit would both foster competition in
conservation (much akin to a grant program) and provide a way for
high conservation value properties to define their worth and
appropriately reward their donors for their contributions.
Another approach for encouraging conservation easements for
higher value conservation properties would be to tie higher credit
227. Low percentages, especially combined with a substantial restriction requirement (see
supra text accompanying note 195) would make frivolous easements much less attractivewith not much to gain, but a substantial property right relinquished.
228. Allowing a state official to, in effect, authorize a federal tax credit might prove
problematic for a number of reasons, thus limiting this option to federal officials only. If the
idea were implemented, the legislation would likely have to specify the offices and officials
that could approve the credit.
229. An alternative or supplemental approach would be to impose an annual dollar cap
on the credit, as with some other present tax credit laws. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 45 (2006)
(detailing the new markets tax credit, which provides a subsidy for investments in lowincome communities). In addition to limiting cost, a cap would require a process for
allocation, which could be done by an agency with greater expertise than the IRS in
conservation policy. See Halperin, supra note 14, at 47-49 (explaining the benefits of a cap
and the involvement of a government agency with relevant policy expertise).
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percentages to the satisfaction of process-based rules designed to
produce good conservation outcomes. This could be achieved by
requiring something akin to a publicly available "conservation
appraisal" of the easement. Instead of appraising the before-andafter value of the easement, the purpose would be to appraise the
easement's likely conservation value.
Variables affecting
conservation value would include expected conservation benefits, 23 1
the strength of the donee organization,' the strength of state and
local law on conservation easements, 232 and the level of
conservation protection provided by the easement's terms.
Key issues here would be the credibility of the appraisal (and
appraiser), appraisal cost, and the ability of the IRS to challenge an
appraisal's findings and deny eligibility for the higher thresholds.
The variables appraised would have to be sufficiently standardized
to make issuing such appraisals fairly objective, verifiable (and so
subject to challenge), and relatively low-cost. Over time, the goal of
the conservation appraisal would be to have a generally accepted
method of assessing the conservation value of an easement.
Initially, the best party (for lack of a better alternative) to perform
234
such appraisals would likely be the donee organization.
230. The appraisal should provide a detailed explanation of the conservation benefits
and explain how the easement would also satisfy the threshold eligibility requirements.
231. This could include, for example, whether the donee is accredited by a rigorous
accreditation program (e.g., the Land Trust Alliance's program), has (and follows) a
monitoring plan for easement enforcement (including a plan for resources), has a system for
tracking the easements it owns, makes the terms of the easements held publicly available,
and provides full, complete, and timely filing of the Form 990.
232. For instance, factors of importance might include whether the state attorney general
has unambiguous power to enforce conservation easements and whether there is a history of
enforcement in the state, the ease of abandonment of easements under state law, the effect
of the recording statutes on easement status, whether easements escheat to the state,
whether the state has a public registry tracking easements, and whether the state is involved
in easement creation and defining valid conservation purposes.
233. The easement should be reviewed for compliance with, among other things, current
Treasury regulation requirements such as use restrictions on the donor and requirements for
transfer of easements (i.e., that transfer may be made only to another conservation
organization or to the public). Ideally, easement terms would be assessed for consistency
with established best conservation practices.
234. A donee organization could not realistically assess its own strength in an objective
manner. This would have to be derived independently of the appraisal, perhaps through
satisfaction of reportable metrics on the Form 990 and by accreditation. Such formal donee
involvement could increase the cost to land trusts of accepting easement contributions, but
donee organizations should arguably be performing a fairly extensive analysis of each
possible contribution in any event. Higher cost per easement could also lead to better
easement quality. Professor Halperin suggests that "the donee should be required to certify
publicly that it views the public benefit to be at the level of the claimed deduction." Halperin,
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Although the donee is an interested party, and so might be
inclined always to issue a positive appraisal (and thus render the
default percentages obsolete), the donee would be accountable to
the public and the IRS for the appraisal and, as a conservation
organization, should take its role as a conservation broker
seriously. 3
6. Refundability and Carryovers
In theory, the credit should be refundable (i.e., to the extent the
donor does not have sufficient tax liability to use the credit, the
unused portion should be paid out, or "refunded" to the donor).
A refundable credit would be the fairest means of ensuring that
donors receive the same amounts with respect to a conservation
contribution.
However, refundable credits add a layer of
administrative complexity, and also become a magnet for abuse
(not to mention increasing the revenue cost of the credit), making
the more traditional and politically accepted nonrefundable credit
a better option. Carryovers, perhaps up to fifteen years, should be
allowed. 3
7. Summary
Of course, if Congress were to adopt a new conservation tax
credit, the above and other details would have to be negotiated,
and there is no one right way to design such a credit. Still, by way
of summary, the goal of the credit should be to fashion rules that
develop conservation value. This can be done by prioritizing some
purposes over others, eliminating the tax benefit for some types of
easements, providing different credit levels (with tougher initial
eligibility requirements for all easements) depending on assurances
supra note 14, at 42.
235. In addition, higher credit percentages could be available for taxpayers that have
performed a "conservation benefit impact statement," in an attempt to encourage the
standardization of the quantification of conservation benefits. See supra notes 96-100. The
conservation benefit statement may be conceptualized as the inverse of an Environmental
Impact Statement, a requirement established by the National Environmental Policy Act that
has since come to be a valuable tool in assessing the environmental impact of development.
236. Many state credits permit carryovers. For a comparison of state features, see
WILLIAM M. SILBERSTEIN, CONSERvATION TAX CREDIT STATE BY STATE COMPARISON, ALI-ABA
COURSE OF STUDY (2005), available at http://files.ali-aba.org/files/coursebooks/pdf/CLO53CH02.pdf; Summary of State Tax Credits for Consemation, PRIVATE LANDOWNER NETWORK,
http://www.privatelandownernetwork.org/exchange/pun.aspx?id=862 (last visited Nov. 16,
2011).
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of conservation value, and strengthening donee eligibility.
A new conservation tax credit is, of course, not the only option.
The current deduction is by now fairly well entrenched. The

deduction model could be retained, but as with the proposed
credit, the measure for the deduction could be changed. Similarly,
many of the ideas above could be incorporated into the deduction.
The overriding goal, however, should be to push the conservation
tax benefit toward a better articulation of the conservation value at
stake.
IV. CONCLUSION
A fundamental problem with the conservation easement tax
expenditure is that the measure for the tax benefit-lost economic
development value-is erroneous. Use of such an erroneous
measure obscures the conservation benefits of the program by
focusing attention and resources on divining a largely extraneous
and unhelpful number. Further, to a considerable extent, the
easement program is reflexively justified and understood based on
this false measure, as if it represented the conservation value of the
program.
This Article has argued that, in theory, the measure for the tax
benefit should be changed to one that better approximates
conservation value.

This would help ensure that the program is

efficient, in the sense that conservation benefits would exceed
program costs.
However, the theory must account for the fact that conservation
value is not, at least not yet, readily susceptible to quantification for
tax purposes. Accordingly, this Article has also argued that a
second-best approach would be to change the measure of the tax
benefit to a more objective number-the fair market value of the
underlying fee interest-not only to provide greater certainty, but
more importantly, to shift administrative and legal resources and
attention to where it should be: on the conservation benefits of the
program.
Finally, this Article has argued that serious consideration should
be given to converting the deduction to a credit. This would make
the tax benefit more equitable and would provide greater flexibility
by more easily allowing for different levels of tax benefit to be
provided based on satisfaction of conservation criteria, which could
evolve over time to account for society's changing needs. In any
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event, irrespective of the details, the conservation easement
expenditure should be designed to promote a concept
conservation value-as an affirmative value-that represents
best use of the land. The value of the tax expenditure should
longer be defined by what is lost, but rather by what is gained.
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